Cinderella Goes to Market

Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe

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New for Old? Ideology, the Family and the Nation

'A Questionnaire for Women': ... Oh – they really want to know everything about me. They're interested in my life hour by hour.... How many hours do I spend (a) on housework; (b) with the children; (c) on spare-time cultural activities?...

But the next question inhibits any desire to be witty: 'Days off due to illness: your own or your children's (number of days in the last year)'.... My Achilles heel. ... Of course, the directors know that I have two children. But nobody's worked out how many days I've had to spend at home with them. If this statistic is unearthed it might frighten them. It might frighten me as well.... Who thought up this questionnaire?... 'and what exactly are *they* after anyway?'

'God knows,' she answers.... 'Questionnaires are fashionable at the moment. What they really want to know is why women don't want to have babies.'...

We don't know how to work out what goes on what. The 'mums' get together. We decide that we must indicate the time spent on travelling: we all live on new housing estates and spend about three hours a day travelling. Nobody can apportion 'time spent with the children' either. We 'spend time with them' while doing everything else. ... Who really knows how much time family life needs? And what is it, anyway?

Olga, the narrator in Natalya Baranskaya's *A Week Like Any Other.*[1]

The state socialists renamed the nuclear family as 'socialist' while continuing to regard it as the basic cell of society and failing to interrogate the gendered division of labour within it. Now a more traditional family model is being envisioned by East Central European societies in transition, as the focal point in the search for identity and new values. This vision casts the family as the smallest unit in the wider ethnic community, invoking its central and salutary role in the process of

establishing new mores. The family is thus seen as a crucial element in the claim to national identity and self-determination.

The role of women-as-mothers is central to the ideology of both models. State socialism 'emancipated' women not as equal citizens, but as worker-mothers. The dual role was legislatively enshrined as well as reinforced daily in practice. The maternal role ascribed to women in the dominant discourse was constructed as a social duty to bear and rear the 'socialist citizens of the future'. Now, the figure of the mother has eclipsed any expanded notion of alternative female role models such as woman-as-citizen. The unitary role of motherhood is being elevated to an ideal in the current transformation. Czech writer Eva Hauserová speaks of 'the "cult of motherhood": the glorification of the traditional female role of wife, mother, and proud homemaker'.[2]

Women's reproductive and 'feminine' nurturing roles are seen as crucial to the survival, not of a particular social system – as they were under state socialism – but of the national or ethnic community. All social ills are laid at the door of state socialism which it is argued undermined the family and women's role within it. In the former Soviet Union, for example, feminist Olga Lipovskaya speaks of 'a patriarchal tradition' and of powerful 'propaganda to send women home.... From conservative writers, the Church and the media comes the familiar charge that the high divorce rate, juvenile delinquency and alcoholism can be directly attributed to women's absence from the family'.[3] Now, all this is to be rectified by a simple semantic shift. Women are to have babies 'for the nation', to teach them the national language and to inculcate in them a love of their ethnic or national heritage.

In the first model, women were exhorted to subordinate their aspirations, and socialist theory's promise of the full development of individual potential, to the needs of the wider society, by contributing to the idealized communist society of the future. In the second, women's self-sacrifice is glorified in the name of individual autonomy (male) in the marketplace and the reconstruction of an imputed past sense of community. The idea appears to be that in some mythologized past, personal and social relations were part of an organic and harmonious community ethic as opposed to what has frequently been described as the atomization of individuals within state socialism.[4]

Inherent in this opposition is a curious ambivalence. The collectivist and would-be egalitarian state socialist past is rejected in the name of an individualist, self-reliant present based on survival in the marketplace. Yet the individually attributed political rights of the democratization process and the notion of competition as the route to collective gain, sit

somewhat uneasily with appeals to a bygone sense of identity and mutuality based on the 'natural' bonds of family and community.

The model of marketization espoused in the former state socialist societies hypothesizes individual entrepreneurs operating from within a family-based 'community', rather than equal citizens invested with rights to claim from 'society' the provision of some collective goods. The nod in the direction of social justice in many Western market economies such as the German (which calls itself a 'social market economy' – '*soziale Marktgesellschaft*') appears to be, for the moment, missing from the equation. Revulsion at the all-pervasive socialist state has produced a violent swing of the pendulum to an extreme form of anti-statism.[5] The rejection of 'society' in favour of traditional 'community' harks back to the nineteenth century, echoing German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies's ideal types which distinguish between the organic *Gemeinschaft* (community) based on the household, a unit of production and consumption characterized by mutuality in the fulfilment of needs, and the modern *Gesellschaft* (society) marked by rationality and based on exchange in the marketplace regulated by legal contract rather than by family ties.

Whatever the parameters of enquiry into the sources of women's continuing oppression in capitalist, state socialist or transitional societies, there is considerable agreement that gender inequalities within the family play a large part in disadvantaging women. The family was seen as the locus of women's subordinate status by nineteenth-century liberal political theorists like John Stuart Mill as well as by Marxists such as August Bebel or Friedrich Engels. Recent Western feminist enquiry of both radical and socialist variety has focused on the psychosocial or social reproductive aspects of gender relations within the private realm as a powerful nexus of unequal and indeed inequitable power relations which help to define women as second-class citizens in the public domain.

While in state socialist societies it was women's dual role which helped to perpetuate gender-based inequalities in the family, feminist analyses in Western democracies have identified the family as a key source of women's social isolation and subordination. State socialism sought to overcome the contradiction by socializing some parts of domestic labour and childcare. By contrast, Western feminism sought to free women from the bonds of the private, not only through their greater participation and visibility in the public sphere, but also through subjecting to scrutiny and attempting to alter the gendered power relations within the private sphere.

In both types of society, the concept of citizenship has expanded to include the right to expect or demand of the state the provision of certain levels of social equity and welfare. This broader view of citizenship rights has direct implications for the quality of life of families, and the rights and duties of women within them. In socialist states, such rights were given from above, as opposed to being won, and were employment-linked, rather than based on the family.[6] In the social democratic welfare model espoused by, say, the Scandinavian countries, there was a similar large-scale involvement of women in the workforce and generous welfare benefits linked with this participation. Some feminist analyses read this situation as perhaps not so liberating or empowering for women as may at first appear. They fear that for women it embodies simply a shift from economic dependence on an individual man to dependence on the state, in other words from private to public patriarchy.[7] Given the similar levels of female labour force participation and social welfare provision in both societies, this observation could be considered to hold true also for the state socialist case.

However, Western capitalism has operated different models of welfare state, each with different implications for women. Crescy Cannan points out that in the current transition period, East Central European societies may favour the Conservative-Corporatist model of social policy – a model epitomized by Germany – together with the 'Anglo-American' liberal model, but as opposed to the Scandinavian social democratic welfare-based model. She refers to the way Stephan Leibfried and Ilona Ostner have adapted Stephan Leibfried's and Gösta Esping-Andersen's 1990 models to draw out the gender issues: the Conservative-Corporatist model is 'predicated on male citizenship in conditions of full male employment and high industrial productivity. Its financial benefits are highly related to work performance and occupational status.' Leibfried and Ostner stress that what they call the 'Bismarckian' model favoured by Germany and Austria on the one hand 'emphasizes capitalist economic development and productivity, on the other the family is seen as a "one-voice one-heart venture"'.

Cannan extrapolates from this model that 'women who are not wives of economically secure men are particularly at risk: single or separated women with interrupted work cycles, women married to men in unstable work, are extremely vulnerable to poverty (cf. the feminization of poverty), as women are assumed to be dependent upon husbands and to be cared for by them. Within the family there is an assumption of privacy, and few services to socialize care and share women's caring

burden with the state. Women's employment is assumed to be low and there is no assumption that this should be changed.'[8]

The way this model operates in the German case, according to Prue Chamberlayne, is that 'the subsidiarity principle, enshrined in the German Constitution, places responsibility for any particular function in society on the lowest organ capable of bearing it. In welfare, responsibility falls first on the family.' For East German women, as well as women in other East Central European countries, this means enormous change, 'for whereas social policy in West Germany privileges housewife roles, the East German system promoted a female employment rate of 90 per cent.'[9]

Cannan points out that in this Bismarckian model, 'perhaps due to the role of the church, identity and personal meaning are assumed to lie in the privacy of the family rather than in the public sphere as in the liberal or social democratic models'. The withdrawal of the state from welfare provision with responsibility devolved onto families clearly implies reliance on the unremunerated, (state-) unsupported and invisible labour of women to fill the gap.

The Hungarian sociologist Mária Adamik points to the current links between economic instrumentality, state withdrawal from public provision, the new Christian-based conservative ideology, and traditional family models:

> There are now powerful interests calling for full-time motherhood to be an officially recognized occupation. This well-known reaction to unemployment, i.e. political and economic problems, may soon join forces with a revived Christian morality to compel women back into their traditional roles. There will no doubt also be a wish to replace the disintegrating social services and health system, and the minimal levels of social benefits, with the unpaid work of women. With these new – but actually only too familiar – regulations, women will be left anywhere but in the Europe towards which the government and the rest of the country is allegedly striving.[10]

In practice, this means that women become the providers as well as the consumers of welfare. It also implies a return from public to private patriarchy. This is as true for some West European countries within the EC as for the emerging market economies of East Central Europe. The adoption of the Conservative-Corporatist model with its devolution of care from the public sector to the private sphere, and the economic dependence of women within that sphere, together imply this reverse shift from that observed in social democratic and state socialist régimes. Women's dependent position will become exacerbated in future as a

result both of past policies linking social welfare entitlement to obligatory employment, and currently high levels of female unemployment. The Hungarian sociologist Júlia Szalai argues the case for welfare entitlement to be unhitched from labour force participation and based instead on some more fundamental notion of civil or citizenship rights.[11]

The notion that making women workers would mean liberation from oppression within the family failed, in part because it did not eliminate the assumption of 'natural' inequalities. Faced with the stresses of the double burden, women are therefore going along, for the present, with the shift back to the unitary role of mother. Women's maternal role in the state socialist and the current transitional societies of East Central Europe reveals both continuity and change. Continuity is evident in the centrality of the family for both state socialism and the newly emerging democracies, as well as in the nature of women's responsibilities within that unit. Change is implied by the contrary movement, the past shift from private to public, and current reversion from public to private patriarchy. This change simultaneously enhances and diminishes women's role within the family.

Ideologically there is affirmation of women's role in that maternal virtues are extolled; in practical terms, too, there is a welcome lessening of stress in the emphasis on a unitary rather than a double or triple role for women. In terms of citizenship rights, there are gains and losses. On the one hand, civil and political rights can be deemed to be augmented, some people in Eastern and Central Europe would argue, by the right to non-interference in the private sphere, or by the right to choose, in relation for example to schooling. However, it would appear that both ideological and practical emphases on the maternal role imply a devolution of state responsibilities which could result in a diminution of women's citizenship rights. Substituting 'care in the community' (for which read individual female carers within the family) for public welfare provision in the name of 'individual responsibility' in effect makes women, as those in Britain have learned over the past decade or so, silent pillars of society's responsibilities, to the detriment of their right to work outside the home or to political participation.

We have seen that the withdrawal of public provision seriously detracts specifically from women's citizenship rights. The way the public/private divide is constructed ideologically also has implications for women's rights. Here the role which nationalism plays is integral to current trends. In the state socialist era, official foregrounding of the public sphere was accompanied by an unofficial elevation of the private sphere. Its importance as the locus of individuality and independence

was often given added meaning as a site of resistance against what was seen as the oppressively interfering state. While women's role within the family and friendship groups was depended upon but denigrated by the state, women gained extra kudos for maintaining the informal networks that formed the basis of a clandestine and embryonic civil society. Conversely, in the current transformation, the private sphere of the family is ideologically esteemed and imbued with spiritual significance. Yet in practice it is downgraded alongside the marketplace or parliament, both currently male-dominated.

The family form being reinvoked in reaction to what was perceived as the false egalitarianism of state socialism is traditional. It evokes strictly gender-demarcated roles and responsibilities in a hierarchy of male authority and female dependence. The search for untarnished values and identities has leapfrogged the often unpleasant realities of both state socialist and Second World War history, turning instead to the spirit of nineteenth-century or inter-war nationalism. For the family, this means in effect reinventing the doctrine of gender-segregated spheres. East Central European nationalist ideology divides the world 'into the public sphere of men's work and political life; and the private – women's – sphere of family and domesticity'.[12]

Again, this echoes Ferdinand Tönnies's ideal type community (*Gemeinschaft*), composed of households based on what he sees as a 'natural' division of labour:

> In defending their common property the task of the woman consists in the protection of valued possessions; the man has to keep off the enemy. To obtain and provide the necessities of living is the field of the man, to conserve and prepare them that of the woman, as far as food is concerned. And when other work and the instruction of the younger therein is needed, we find that the masculine energy is directed towards the outside, fighting, and leading the sons. The woman, on the other hand, remains confined to the inner circle of home life and is attached to the female children. . . . But such a division of labour may also be regarded as a relation between guidance and leadership, on the one hand, and compliance and obedience, on the other. It must be recognized that all these differentiations follow a pattern of nature . . .[13]

This model justifies gender divisions by the fact that 'women are usually led by feelings' and what Tönnies calls the natural will. They lack 'the requirements of rational will' which the male of the species, led more 'by intellect', requires in order to cultivate 'farsightedness', 'because to him falls the guidance and leadership, at least in all activities concerned with the outside world'. It follows that 'for women, the home and not the

market, their own or a friend's dwelling and not the street, is the natural seat of their activity'.[14]

In their different ways, then, both state socialism and the current transitional societies have redefined and reinforced the gendered public/private divide. But if women's role within the private sphere had an enhanced significance under state socialism in terms of an embryonic civil society, current nationalist idealization of the maternal role by contrast prioritizes women's reproductive responsibilities within the family at the expense of their citizenship rights within the wider society.

Shifts in the significance attributed to their role in the family make women complicit in material and psychological limitations on their autonomy. For those women who have known the confidence as well as the relative economic independence conferred by labour force participation as the norm,[15] it would be surprising if the next few years did not witness a modification of their initial apparent collusion with relegation to motherhood as their primary sphere of responsibility. In the short term, however, the Hungarian journalist Zsuzsa Béres feels that 'sheer physical exhaustion and a deeply ingrained sense of guilt' explain Hungarian women's lack of resistance to 'awesome challenges to their human rights, dignity and self-respect'.[16] Whatever the shape of things to come, it is crucial to our understanding of how these processes affect women's citizenship status to analyse the role and significance of the family in the past and the present societies of East Central Europe.

Gender Divisions within the 'Socialist' Family

The family in the official canon of state socialism was seen not so much as the source of citizenship rights nor as a social unit embodying individual rights, but as the locus of duties towards society and the state. Women were not only productive workers, but were exhorted by the state to fulfil their reproductive duties. Chapter 1 described how early theoretical formulations were cemented in legislation enunciating women's dual or even triple role. It made clear how gestures in the direction of alleviating the impossible demands this placed on women by socializing housework and childcare were both conceptually contradictory and practically inadequate.

The dual role both contributed to and was reinforced by the failure to address traditional gender divisions within the family. Occupational segregation and wage differentials played their part in undermining notions of an equitable sharing of parental or housework responsibilities. Thus paid leave enabling parents to tend sick children was

taken overwhelmingly by women, even in those countries where it was available to either parent, since men often occupied positions higher up career pyramids and hence were regarded as less dispensable at work. In Poland, such leave was available only to mothers, fathers' eligibility for it having been rescinded in 1975.[17]

This 'natural' practice led to the extraordinary situation in Hungary, where it is calculated, mothers with young children spent up to 50 per cent of their total annual work time away due to legal entitlements such as maternity or sick leave. In Hungary, such sick leave was unlimited up to the child's first birthday, comprised 84 days annually up to the child's third birthday, 40 days until the age of 6, and 14 days annually from 6–10 years.[18]

Similarly, another form of positive discrimination, the 'household day – one day's leave a month on full pay enabling women in the former GDR 'to catch up on household tasks'[19] – was introduced as a short-term measure to alleviate women's double burden. Instead, it perpetuated the existing gendered division of domestic labour. Women only were eligible for the 'household day', unless men could show that they were lone parents or that their wives were certified ill by a doctor! If the state paid women to do household tasks, men argued, then why should they share them? The result was a self-perpetuating vicious circle.

Paid sick leave to look after children, extended maternity and childcare leave, and measures such as the 'household day' mitigated against women being considered suitable candidates for management positions, since they were too often absent from their jobs. And the fact that their jobs were consequently usually lower status and less well paid than that of their partners was not conducive to changes in gendered role allocation within the family. Conversely, the exigencies of their heavy domestic duties made women less willing to take on positions of responsibility at work or in politics. Thus it is clear that under state socialism, gender-specific elements of official social policy, instigated to alleviate women's double or triple burden, in effect reinforced both traditional gender-divided roles within the family and women's disadvantaged position in the public sphere.

The gender blindness of state socialist conceptions of the family not only reinforced the gender-based division of domestic labour, but also tended to reproduce gendered role expectations in the practices of upbringing and early childhood education. A GDR decree on pre-school education assumed equality of educational opportunity. It enjoined pre-school childcare facilities to 'ensure a harmonious

physical, mental and linguistic training of children and the formation of socialist qualities and modes of behaviour'. Nowhere was there mention of gender differences or of any need to break down gender-based inequalities in the treatment of boys and girls. By contrast, the preamble to the GDR's Education Law stipulated equal opportunities for girls and women in education, to be achieved in part by positive discrimination such as the 'measures for the promotion of women' (*'Frauenförderungsmaßnahmen'*) which enabled working women to attend vocational courses on a day-release basis. School curricula were uniform throughout primary and secondary education, so that the problem of gender-biased subject choices identified by Western feminist educational sociologists did not apply.

That preconceptions about gender roles nevertheless persisted in the GDR was obliquely acknowledged in official discourse by a passing reference to the need for overcoming 'obsolete traditions and habits' in the next generation.[20] This need was demonstrable in research into gender-specific attitudes among GDR school and pre-school children conducted in the late 1960s. The results revealed deeply entrenched gender stereotypes in children of both sexes, about whether boys or girls are cheekier, have more fun, and so on.[21]

Some studies suggest that great efforts were made at crèche and kindergarten level to institute non sexist behaviour.[22] Yet perusal of the illustrations in a standard pre-school text and the first reader used in GDR schools in the late 1970s reveals traditional gender-divided behaviour in the family and gender-segregated workplace occupations. The only time Daddy is portrayed as actively involved in family tasks is when he helps the children prepare a gift for Mummy on International Women's Day. Mothers and grandmothers are shown carrying shopping bags, serving the dinner, supervising play and picking up children from school. In a picture of children doing chores, it is of course the daughter who washes up, and tells her little brother to dry the dishes. Road awareness is inculcated with stories about Stefan who falls off his bike while learning to ride (read: boys are too wild, daredevils, not careful enough), Jutta who teaches her little sister how to cross the road safely (read: girls are cautious, prudent, little mothers), and Sabine who is crying because she is lost, but impresses the policeman with her knowledge of her address (girls are cry-babies, but sensible underneath it).[23]

In the sections of both books that describe the kinds of jobs done by adults, women or mothers appear as dairymaids, doctors, primary school teachers, textile workers, draughtsmen[24] and supermarket

cashiers. Men and fathers appear in a far greater diversity of roles, as architects, engineers, construction workers, brigade leaders, steelworkers, machine tool operators, bus drivers, performing artists, and soldiers of the National People's Army (NVA).[25] There is no encouragement of alternative role models; and certainly men are not depicted in any of the caring or childrearing professions. In reality too, nursery and kindergarten teachers in the GDR were 100 per cent female, as were 77 per cent of all school teachers.

With such gendered patterns of socialization, it is hardly surprising that despite some suggestions of change among the younger generation, women in East Central Europe remained responsible for the overwhelming majority of domestic labour. While 66 per cent of women and 60 per cent of men in the former GDR asserted in 1988 that domestic labour was shared fairly equally between them, a 1985 survey had shown that in practice women were still shouldering at least 60 per cent of the work. This was less than the 75–80 per cent of household tasks and childcare performed by women in Poland and Hungary. And in the former GDR it represented a significant change from the 80 per cent female share recorded in a UNESCO study in 1970.[26]

Recent surveys reveal a high degree of congruence in family time budgets between individual state socialist countries. In most cases women spent on average more than four hours per day on household chores and childcare compared with just over an hour for men. Studies conducted in 1984 in Hungary and Poland suggested that women spent a staggering total of over six hours daily on household chores and childcare.[27] (Interestingly, a very small proportion of the total was spent on childcare.)

A breakdown of household tasks shows that where men did participate, they performed more attractive, occasional or traditionally male-designated tasks rather than the daily drudgery of mundane or repetitive jobs. Interviews with women in Bulgaria in 1980 revealed that 78 per cent of men took responsibility for winter heating and 81.3 per cent for household repairs, but that only 1 per cent helped with cooking, washing and cleaning. Increases in men's 'help' over time were registered in the area of childcare, at least in Bulgaria and the former GDR. Men tended to play with the children for a limited period in the evening, or help with homework, but not to feed, bathe or put them to bed. Some fathers took their children to crèche or kindergarten. One area where tasks were perhaps most equitably shared in Bulgaria and Hungary was cultivating the private plot or allotment so crucial to the family's material welfare.[28]

Where children were expected to help at home, their tasks tended to be gender-segregated. More girls than boys had fixed chores for which they were responsible; boys were granted more time to themselves. Boys were usually asked to help with repair jobs or work in the garden, whilst girls participated in cleaning the house or looking after younger brothers and sisters. In other words, boys learned neutral or technical skills, but girls were initiated into social and caring roles.[29]

Women's overwhelming share of domestic labour was amplified by the context in which they worked full-time, as opposed to the majority of women involved in labour market participation in Western Europe, who work part-time. For the duration of most of the former GDR's history, for example, this meant a 43¾ hour working week. Moreover, providing for the family did not mean a one-stop shop at the local supermarket. To varying degrees in the shortage economies of the different state socialist countries it involved repeated queueing and disappointment. Irregular supply of foodstuffs was augmented by the lack in many cases of a family car, necessitating daily shopping.

Alena Kroupová cites a 1983 survey of leisure time showing that women in Czechoslovakia were away from home for around ten hours per day with work, shopping and commuting. The quotation from Baranskaya's novella which opens this chapter makes it clear that in Russia the figure was nearer twelve hours a day, not including shopping. Adding four to six extra hours of domestic labour to this long stint goes a long way toward illuminating the chronic fatigue described by East Central European women. The resulting fourteen to eighteen hour working day combined with the gendered domestic division of labour to give men between one and three hours more leisure time per day than their wives, for rest and recuperation, or for personal and career development.[30]

As if the heavy demands of the dual role were not sufficient, official rhetoric urged women to become involved in socially responsible or political roles. Examples were voluntary activity in the trades union, or on school and neighbourhood committees. The stresses of this additional burden were resisted by some women, but shouldered by many.[31] Analyses by both sociologists and activists have revealed that one reason for the dearth of feminist consciousness in the former GDR was that women were made to feel any frustration or difficulty they might experience in trying to fulfil their multiple roles as a personal failure. And women themselves usually failed to recognize the structural causes of their inequality and oppression.[32]

Zsuzsa Béres decries the constant sense of inadequacy this engendered. Pressure to perform in two or even three roles left women

feeling 'constantly tormented by a guilty conscience over not performing up to the mark – in any capacity', labelled as '"unreliable" worker, "bad" mother, and inattentive wife'. As a result, 'Hungary's women don't want to be liberated'. Instead they dream of deliverance from the multiple afflictions with which state socialism beset them. This made them susceptible, asserts Béres, to the 'God, Homeland, Family' slogans of the conservative political parties currently in power, during the 1990 election campaign: 'Home and hearth, glorious motherhood, Husband the Provider – the foolproof answer to the woes of the tottering nuclear family. And we shall all live happily ever after.'[33]

Irreconcilable Demands: The Worker–Mother's Story

Literature in state socialist countries by the late 1970s often gave voice to the contradictions between rhetoric and reality for which there was no alternative public forum. Political constraints held the media in a straitjacket, so that novels were widely read for what they said 'between the lines' about the social or political situation. It was this as much as cultural policy urging writers to make their works accessible to ordinary people which vouchsafed for literature a far wider reading public than that enjoyed by most Western authors. Moreover, the fact that literature was closely scrutinized by the state security forces enhanced its appeal to some readers and brought writers (a sometimes unwelcome) political prominence. 'For nearly two centuries, the literature of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary ... has been the object of this dubious style of official attention. In these circumstances, it ceases to be a marginal leisure-time activity and becomes crypto-politics.'[34]

Literature's role as sociological evidence as well as political platform makes it apt for us to look to fictional representations for portrayals of the objective reality of women's overburdening as well as the subjective experience of ambiguity and ambivalence. The rhetoric of official discourse as well as early socialist realist literature tended to be wholehearted and simplistic in its affirmation of socialist goals, 'black and white' in its rendition of socially approved values and role models. By the 1970s, however, there was a noticeable shift towards more nuanced and problematic versions of the relationship between the individual and society. Natalia Baranskaya's famous novella *A Week Like Any Other* and short stories written by a new generation of women writers in the former GDR began to voice the problematic nature of women's dual or triple role, their constant sense of guilt and inadequacy.

Natalia Baranskaya writes of the simultaneous guilt and resentment felt by the harassed worker-mother as she tears from work to home and back again, always late, perpetually anxious, constantly having to apologize, to her boss who interprets her lateness as a sign of 'an attitude to work [which] does not seem to us sufficiently rigorous', to her family when they have to wait for dinner:

> I'm running again, to get home to them quickly. I run and my bag full of shopping bangs against my knees as I go. On the bus I see by my watch that it's already seven – they're home by now. I hope that Dima isn't letting them fill up on bread and has remembered to put on the potatoes. I run along the paths, cut through the waste-land, and run up the stairs. Just as I'd thought: the children are munching bread; Dima has forgotten everything and is absorbed in a technical journal. I light all the gas rings and put on the potatoes, the kettle and the milk. I fling some cutlets into the frying-pan and, twenty minutes later, our supper is ready.[35]

An oral history account of the same harried daily round stresses the psychologically as well as professionally damaging effects on women in the former Soviet Union:

> Tired after their workday, they hurry home to childcare centres. Bowed with the weight of grocery bags, they drag their children behind them. In a terrible crush of people, they wedge themselves into overcrowded public buses elbowing people aside and pushing their way through to an empty seat, if there is one. At last, they reach home. Here new cares await them: dinner must be prepared and the husband and children must be fed. The laundry and housecleaning still await because, for a working woman, there is no other time for these chores. She cannot depend on her husband for anything.
>
> The next morning, these women, with glum, blank expressions, take their children to school or childcare centres and hurry to work. They perform their jobs mechanically, without inspiration, without enthusiasm...[36]

A bitterly ironic testament to the impossibility of reconciling successfully the roles of career woman and mother, especially for lone mothers, is contained in Irmtraud Morgner's short story 'Das Seil' ('The Tightrope').[37] The title prefigures the story's message that being a worker-mother involved a constant balancing act which could easily fail, indeed could cost you your life. Dr Vera Hill is a research physicist and solo mother of a three-year-old son. One fine evening she is accused of witchcraft by the superstitious locals in the small town where she lives and works. At pub closing time, a delegation delivers a petition to the director of the atomic physics research institute where she works.

Grounds for the accusation are that the locals claim to have seen her traversing the town on foot, suspended high up in the air above them, twice a day, morning and evening. Not only has she knocked yellow plums and cherry branches off a local farmer's trees with her briefcase, thus threatening the orchard's economic survival, but worse still, they maintain, the sight of black nylon lace and garters from people's balconies is endangering the morals of the community.

Faced with the petition, the director is initially incredulous. He judges 'walking on air to be a ridiculous form of slander'. On reflection, however, he realizes the potentially serious implications of the case for the work of the institute. 'He was afraid of not getting the allocation of hard currency needed for the purchase of an English computer.' He confronts Vera, who readily acknowledges that it's true, she does use a tightrope.

Since she lives on the opposite side of town from the institute, travel time is a major factor in the juggling feat required to reconcile her various roles and responsibilities. Deprived of the short-cut by tightrope, she points out, she would not be able to complete her post-doctoral research by the due date. 'In contrast to him, she added, she did not have the services of a housewife or live-in maid at her disposal.' So after shopping, picking up her son from kindergarten, feeding and bathing him, reading stories and putting him to bed, washing and mending and preparing clothes for the next day, she can only sit down at her desk by 9 p.m., and has to get up again in the morning at 5 a.m.

Without the tightrope trick, she would get to her post-doctoral research an hour later each evening, and have to get up an hour earlier each morning. And with less than six hours' sleep at night, she says, she has no head for nuclear physics. The director, mesmerized by Vera's lips and his recent affair with her, nevertheless accuses her of putting her own interests before the fate of the institute. He implores her to desist forthwith. Unnerved by the force of his argument, Vera loses her footing next day. Her body is found by the lamplighter in front of the local library.

It is obvious that the kind of stress levels described by Baranskaya would find expression in tensions within the family. By the end of the week, the tension bursts for Olga, the first-person narrator of *A Week Like Any Other*:

> I carry Kotka off to bed myself (normally Dima does it) and see that... Dima is sitting in an armchair reading a journal – he really is sitting and reading.

> As I pass by I say loudly: 'Incidentally, I've got a degree as well, you know, I'm just as highly trained as you are.'
> 'Congratulations,' Dima replies.
> This seems to me extremely nasty and hurtful. . . .
> 'You should be ashamed of yourself,' I shout, 'I'm tired, do you understand, tired.'[38]

Extremely high divorce statistics in most of these countries provided powerful indicators that all was not well with the 'socialist' family. Moreover, it was women who petitioned for more than two thirds of all divorces. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the former Soviet Union and the former GDR divorce rates were amongst the highest in the world, with a staggering 33–44 per cent of marriages failing.[39] The high divorce rate which characterized these four countries was not true of Poland (even though there too two thirds of divorce applications were filed by women). Presumably this reflects both the influence of Catholic morality and the persistence of traditional norms in relation to conceptions of the family.[40]

The incidence of divorce increased sharply throughout the state socialist period.[41] This suggests a causality directly linked with the irreconcilable stresses of women's dual role. Yet the fact that women initiated two out of three divorces also intimates a more positive interpretation. It suggests an increased autonomy on the part of women which itself may derive from their sense of identity as workers, partial though their economic independence may have been.

The high divorce rate also meant that the 'socialist' family itself, consisting of two parents and one or two children, had by the 1980s become an ideological construct which bore less and less resemblance to reality. In the former GDR, one third of all children – and over half of all first children – were born to unmarried mothers, even though some of these would have been living in stable relationships. Of all families with children, 18 per cent were single-parent households. By the end of 1989, the one-child family constituted half of all GDR families. In the former Soviet Union too, a 1983 survey in the city of Perm revealed that 41 per cent of children were conceived outside marriage.[42]

Despite the high failure rate and the considerable gender-based imbalances in the allocation of family responsibilities, in 1988 a majority of both women (55 per cent) and men (64 per cent) in the former GDR expressed themselves 'satisfied' with the domestic division of labour. And it seems that the institution of marriage itself was not questioned. Marriage remained an important life goal and aspiration, at least for young people in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.[43] Not only did people in

the state socialist countries of East Central Europe continue to marry; they also married young, about five years earlier than their West European counterparts, only to divorce three to five years later.[44]

Yet as sociologist Hana Navarová has pointed out in her study of young families in Czechoslovakia, whilst marriage remained an aspiration, in practice it proved not so easy. She maintains that marriage was 'very often an idealized relationship, expected to secure intimacy, stability and the chance for self-expression' in compensation for the alienation experienced elsewhere in everyday life under state socialism. In conversation with feminist journalist Slavenka Drakulić from the former Yugoslavia, a Hungarian woman links this idealization of interpersonal relationships, derived from the lack of a public sphere, with the failure of marriages:

> When there is no space in society to express your individuality, the family becomes the only territory in which you can form it . . . [and] express it. But a family is too limiting, there is not space enough in it for self-expression either, and negative feelings accumulate very soon. We started to hate each other, but we stayed together because of the bigger enemy, waiting for each of us, out there – the solidarity of victims, I guess.[45]

Reality was clearly not half so romantic as the ideal. Most couples lived in tiny apartments, often still with their parents due to acute housing shortages. Consumer satisfaction was limited due to the relative shortages of consumer durables and foodstuffs. Getting repairs done was a nightmare due to the severe shortage of tradespeople and an under-developed service sector.[46]

The stresses of daily life were not helped by the fact that all members of the family were out of the house and away from each other for long hours each day, so that family life was often limited to the weekend. Until spring 1989 in the GDR, children attended school on Saturday mornings, so escape from the pollution of the city to the family '*dacha*' or allotment could not occur until lunchtime on Saturday. Inevitably, children suffered. Childcare facilities in many countries were considered to be impersonal, overcrowded and, as a result of poor staff-child ratios, overly regimented. Parents often tried to make up for the time they were unable to spend with their children by showering them with material goods. Children's toys and clothes were both subsidized and among the most highly developed consumer goods in terms of attractiveness and availability. Popular sentiment in many of these countries held that children (if not self-employed plumbers or electricians!) constituted the true 'ruling class' of state socialism.

The relative deprivations of family life, especially in its repercussions for children, found expression in several short stories by GDR women writers in the mid- to late 1970s. 'Hänsel und Gretel: Kein Märchen' ('Hansel and Gretel: Not a Fairy Tale')[47] by Charlotte Worgitzky describes the Holtzhauers, who 'could be used as an exemplary model for a publication on GDR families: two children, modern flat with central heating . . . the long since ordered Trabant (car) due for delivery in two years'. Elvira Holtzhauer is completing her economics degree, broken off when she had the children, in a course of study which is especially intended for young mothers but makes no concessions to their need for childcare coverage. Her exams are looming, so in the absence of available grandmothers, the Holtzhauers decide to put the children, three and five years old, into a weekly children's home. The children run away and find their way from the outskirts of the city back home. The scene repeats itself a year later. This time the police return the fugitive children to the children's home without the preoccupied parents even becoming aware of the drama.

In 'Und der steinerne Elefant' ('And the Stone Elephant')[48] by Angela Stachowa, a small boy whispers in the ear of the playground elephant, telling him how lonely he is. One or other of his parents is invariably away on work-associated trips. Or if not, then they are so exhausted from their working day that they require peace and quiet. Either way, he gets sent out to play by himself until 7 p.m. precisely, by which time it is already dark. In the night, the elephant gathers the other stone animals from the playground and ascends to the little boy's flat, trampling the parents in their sleep. Awoken from a 'terrible night' in which she also dreamed of Hendrik, his mother seriously considers consulting the child-rearing manual to see how many hours per day one should optimally spend with children. Henceforth she packs Hendrik into the car and takes him with her whenever she travels for her job. 'But mother has to work. And in the places she takes him to there are not even stone animals.'

Given the difficulties of family life, why should young people in these societies wish to marry at all? In her oral history account of 'Why Soviet Women Want to Get Married' Ekaterina Alexandrova speaks of an element of continuity in patriarchal patterns which construe marriage as 'perhaps the most important achievement in a woman's life, no matter how educated or independent she is and no matter how successful she has been in her profession'. In this, she adds:

> There really is something to be surprised about and something hard to understand. Here is a society that has proclaimed as its goal the extrication of women from the narrow confines of the family and the inclusion of these women in all forms of public activity. And it would appear that this society had achieved its goal – Soviet women work at the most varied jobs, and many of them are well educated, have a profession, and are financially independent of men. And yet, in this very society, among these very women, a patriarchal social order and its psychology thrive.[49]

This paradoxical hankering for the married state persists in the former Soviet Union despite considerable evidence that young women's aspirations centre on a fulfilling job and a child, rather than on marriage. Tatyana, a young woman studying at the Moscow Lenin State Pedagogical Institute, suggested in 1988: 'My first priority is to love my work. . . . Once that's established, I can support a child.' She and her friends laughingly dismissed the idea of marriage, asserting that 'I, personally, wish to bring up a child by myself, without a man' and adding scornfully: 'A man! Who needs a *second* child?' Underlining this trend (which sets the former Soviet Union apart from Czechoslovakia, for instance) a survey in Azerbaijan in the early 1980s indicated that only 23 per cent of urban and 40 per cent of rural young people saw marriage as a valuable social institution.[50] Opinions such as Tatyana's and survey results such as these would seem to signal generational, urban/rural and possibly social group differences in attitudes to marriage.

The main reason behind the relative haste in marrying was the shortage of housing stock. In Budapest in 1990, there were 70,000 people on the council waiting list for approximately 7,000 flats. People in Warsaw expected to wait twenty to thirty years for a flat.[51] Young people moved up the priority list for access to a flat if they were married, and further increased their chances of a place of their own with each child born into the marriage. The units in new apartment blocks had a restricted ground plan designed with a nuclear family in mind. Hence, in a directly material sense, housing scarcity under state socialism can be seen to have favoured a traditional form of partnership and discriminated against alternative living arrangements.

Traditional (and orthodox religious) notions of sexuality and marriage were thus reinforced in these societies by a potent combination of state socialist puritanism and practicality. Since young people frequently lived with their parents (and sometimes grandparents) in cramped accommodation, gaining the privacy for sexual relations was problematic. Having sex was often possible only through the legitimation of marriage. Conversely, getting pregnant was sometimes seen as the only

way to 'catch your man' or get a flat. Despite legally available abortion in Czechoslovakia, pregnancy was cited as a prime motive for marriage. In 1988, some 60–70 per cent of couples in the younger age bracket married because the bride was pregnant. And in Hungary, newspaper reports accused women of 'accepting the role of mother to gain an apartment'.[52]

Another explanation for the survival of marriage as the norm was located in traditional attitudes which labelled remaining single as aberrant or strange behaviour. In Poland, there was still a sense that to be an 'old maid' carried a stigma. In the former Soviet Union too 'it is just splendid, and utterly normal, to be a single, divorced mother ... [but] it is still a considerable stigma to be a spinster'. And in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while it was acceptable for women to be divorced, never to have been married was seen as deviant: 'unmarried women are seen as being in some ways "deficient"'. And failing to take one's husband's surname leads to the assumption that one is not married, 'which is viewed in a very negative light'. Similarly, in the former Soviet Union, it was thought that in filling out the endless forms of state socialist bureaucracy, 'writing *not married* in the appropriate blank is shameful and degrading ... the word *divorced* looks better than *not married* in the eyes of Soviets, women included'.[53]

Further, the continuing attraction of marriage derived from the conflicting values attached to the family under state socialism. In official discourse the family was the basic unit of society, yet at the same time the private realm was demeaned beside the prioritized public domains of industry and politics. Writing of the early state socialist period in Hungary, sociologist Zsuzsa Ferge stated that '"work" was a politically loaded concept from the start. The most "socialist" type of work was employment in the state sector. ... Work in other sectors, be it self-employment or the household, was strongly depreciated.'[54] Hence full-time wives and mothers were denigrated as 'bourgeois relics' and discriminated against in the sense that most social welfare entitlement came via labour force participation.

At the unofficial level, however, the private sphere enjoyed an enhanced aura both as haven from the long arm of the socialist state, and site of resistance to oppressive state power. Indeed 'a partial "rehabilitation" of the right for privacy' was explicitly granted to Hungarians by Kádar from the early 1970s in return for compliance in the public sphere.[55] Slavenka Drakulić gives voice to the ambivalent feelings about, but fierce defence of, private spaces universally felt by the women she visited across East Central Europe during early 1990:

> Apartments were for us mythical cult objects ... they were life prizes, and we still regard them as such. ... An apartment, however small, however crowded with people and things, kids and animals, is 'ours'. To survive, we had to divide the territory, to set a border between private and public. The state wants it all public – it can't see into our apartment, but it can tap our telephone, read our mail. We didn't give up: everything beyond the door was considered 'theirs'. They wanted to turn our apartments into public spaces, but we didn't buy that trick. What is public is of the enemy. So we hid in our pigeonholes, leaned on each other in spite of everything, and licked our wounds.[56]

Perpetuating this defence of the private, a traditional view of the family and the division of labour within it began to resurface in Hungary already during the early to mid-1980s. This arose in part due to the impact of the 'second' economy, in which approximately 60–75 per cent of Hungarian families (mostly through the men) were involved by the late 1980s. Zsuzsa Ferge commented in 1989:

> The attractiveness of the duality of the 'hardworking man' and the woman staying at home and taking care of her family has increased over the last few years. ... Because of the growing difficulties in providing a livelihood, more and more men spend more and more hours on extra work on the basis of the new possibilities.[57]

The Public/Private Divide: Paradoxes and Inversions

The role of the family is ambivalent and has carried diametrically opposed values. Contradictory meanings have been attributed to it by official discourse and unofficial practice in East Central Europe both in the state socialist past and in the nationalist present. These in turn differ from Western feminist ways of regarding the family's function as pivotal in oppressing women and in mediating their relations with the wider society.

Under state socialism, many people invested the family with meaning as the source of dignity and creativity in a society characterized by alienated labour processes. There was a tendency to idealize it, construing it as a harmonious collectivity pitted against the difficulties and strife of coping with the shortcomings of daily life, in a unity of interests against the intrusive state and over-politicized public domain. Benefits dispensed by this same state in the form of affordable housing, subsidized transport, food and children's clothing, public childcare facilities, and extended maternity and childcare leave, were so utterly taken for granted that they did not figure in the calculation.

The family was also regarded as fostering solidarity in an atomized society. It united the 'us' of non-existent or embryonic civil society against 'them' in state power. This explains, maintains Polish sociologist Renata Siemieńska, why 'subjectively, women [in Poland] were not so dissatisfied' with their unequal position within the family. Sociologist Mira Marody goes one step further, asserting that despite being 'objectively disadvantaged' in both their private and their public roles, women did and do not perceive their situation as involving '*socially* determined gender inequalities'. Rather, they accept their inferior status as biologically rather than socially determined, so that it is 'natural that women spend more time at home and men – for public activity'. This perception of 'natural' roles is in turn reinforced by what Marody calls the '"authorities vs. society" dichotomy'.[58]

In Poland, Elżbieta Tarkowska and Jacek Tarkowski maintain that 'distrust of the state and other official institutions can be traced back to when Poland was partitioned by foreign powers' (for 150 years from 1795). Bożena Umińska points out that 'with the disappearance of Poland as a state, there vanished a vast sphere of life where men played a dominant role (institutions of government, administration, education etc.), and family and home became a place where all national values could – and had to – be hidden and preserved for future revival. Thus the role of women was considerably enhanced.' Indeed 'woman ruled the nineteenth-century Polish family ... the only institution of national life on the territory once belonging to Poland'.[59]

Again, the link is drawn between withdrawal into the private sphere and nationalist aspirations thwarted by foreign domination. This link also provides a continuity of antagonism to the state between the 150-year period of partition of Poland, the period of Nazi occupation, and what were perceived as Soviet-dominated state socialist institutions. After a brief interlude when politics seemed possible in the Solidarity era of 1980-81, the imposition of martial law in 1981 fostered the continuity of the 1970s 'private society'. These analyses make plain that in the Polish case at least, there is an intimate connection between the private realm as bastion against state interference, gendered role divisions defined as 'natural', and nationalism. Marody writes in 1991 that 'the general division into "Us vs. Them" swallowed all other forms of social identity and promoted a negative social solidarity. Poles found it easier to integrate and unite *against* rather than *for* something. The fundamental category around which yearning for positive unity can be satisfied will most likely be the nation.'[60]

The solidarity of 'the people' versus state institutions and 'the system'

obscured gender difference while making family and friendship groups not just subjectively but indeed objectively extremely important. Informal networks functioned as sources of information, as conduits for scarce goods, and as bases for the operation, in Hungary and Poland, of the 'second' economy. Although the 'second' economy mostly fulfilled material rather than spiritual needs, its networks also offered intimacy and intense loyalty as well as the human resources needed for the grassroots educational, social and political activities so sorely lacking because forbidden in the public sphere. According to Tarkowska and Tarkowski, these 'microstructures ... constituted an alternative public sphere' which 'generated social integration'.

On the darker side of this development however, 'internal ties frequently degenerated because of the rivalry of consumers caused by economic shortages ... and competition between microstructures leads to a world divided between "family members" and "strangers"'. This description sounds almost like a prophecy of the intense xenophobia associated with current ethnic and nationalist striving in East Central Europe. Tarkowska and Tarkowski use Banfield's term 'amoral familism' to describe it. They see it as caused by the shortage economy:

> ... compounded by residues of Poland's peasant tradition and mentality which stress the limited world of friends and family. Furthermore, there is the gentry tradition based on exuberant individualism and egoism as well as Catholic traditionalism. ... The Catholic ethic is tied to a value dualism. The Catholic worldview separates the private from the public and the values appropriate to both spheres.[61]

Although Tarkowska and Tarkowski do not consider the gender aspects of this phenomenon, these microstructures were clearly mediated by the women at the centre of the family. Polish sociologist Anna Titkow makes explicit the impact of Catholic ideology even before the current transformation on perpetuating the public/private divide and ascribing women responsibility for the latter sphere:

> The Church's influence on defining women's position in Polish society, where 75 per cent of women are faithful and practising Catholics, hardly has to be proven – especially when we constantly hear how woman's domain is home and family while man's world is his job, politics, and all activities outside the family circle.[62]

In the former GDR too, women were situated, through their role as wives, mothers, sisters, friends, at the focal point of the highly valued 'niche' society, as the privatized world of family and friends was known

there. The centrality of this role, together with the gender-transcending solidarity of the private sphere, seems to have over-ridden any oppression suffered by women within it. Women were prepared to maintain privacy and non-intrusion by the state in the name of individual autonomy, even if that autonomy were exclusively male.

Idealization of the private sphere as the locus of freedom and individuality echoes nineteenth-century liberal notions of privacy. John Stuart Mill postulated a sphere of action in which the state has only an indirect interest as the 'appropriate region of human liberty'. Drawing out this liberal concept of privacy as a precondition for human freedom, Steven Lukes infers that:

> in general, the idea of privacy refers to a sphere that is not of proper concern to others. It implies a negative relation between the individual and some wider 'public', including the state – a relation of non-interference with, or non-intrusion into, some range of his thoughts and/or action. This condition may be achieved either by his withdrawal or by the 'public's' forbearance. Preserving this sphere is characteristically held by liberals to be desirable, either for its own sake as an ultimate value ... or else as a means to the realization of other values, such as that of (self-development).

Lukes cites as 'essential elements in the ideas of equality and liberty' the 'four unit-ideas of individualism – respect for human dignity, autonomy, privacy and self-development'.[63]

Feminist critics of Mill have pointed out, however, that while he espoused formal equality of rights for men and women in the public sphere, Mill failed to address the unequal power relations within the family which directly resulted from the continued confinement of women to the private sphere. As Jean Bethke Elshtain writes: 'He embraces a traditional division of labour *within* the family based on males being actively employed *outside* the home.' Hence it is clear already in Mill's proposed solution that formal citizenship rights alone are meaningless. Without a fundamental restructuring of gender relations within the private sphere, women are rendered powerless to exert their citizenship rights in the public domain.[64]

Hence gender relationships are power relations deriving from the nineteenth-century signification as 'natural', of a divide which attributes to men and women respectively, activity in the public domain and the private realm. The public/private split, and women's economically dependent status, located women's oppression squarely in the private sphere. This led nineteenth-century liberal feminists to emphasize the importance of women gaining access to the public sphere of work

and politics, an emphasis which was reiterated in the socialist notion of women's emancipation.

The entry of large numbers of women into the workforce in both Western and East Central Europe after the Second World War undermined the demarcation of public and private as male and female domains respectively. However, the recognition that entry into the public sphere alone did not eradicate women's subordination led modern feminists to argue that power relations between the sexes needed to be examined in both the public and the private spheres.

The problem was (and is) how to define the boundaries between what is deemed public and what is defined as private. Initially, Western feminists of the so-called second wave wanted to validate women's subjective experience within the family. Using the slogan 'the personal is political', they carried this subjective reality into the public sphere and demanded a hearing for it there. Further, they sought to break through the rigid public/private divide which confined women to a lesser realm by demonstrating that both the state and the economy depend upon the family.[65] The argument that family life is in fact state-regulated is corroborated by legislation concerning marriage and a wife's tax status, sexuality and social welfare, which denies the liberal claim to the inviolable principle of privacy within the family.[66]

Western feminists have had considerable success in demolishing the view that legal regulation stops at the garden gate. State institutions like the police and the judiciary have come to mediate and adjudicate in cases of domestic violence which previously remained confined within the jealously guarded privacy of the marital home. Rape within marriage can in Britain now be contested in court. In a contrary trend, far from 'exploding' the public/private split, state socialism in effect entrenched this divide, with the private sphere being idealized along classical nineteenth-century liberal lines as the source of gender-neutral individualism and anti-state solidarity.

Zsuzsa Ferge addressed this East-West difference in approach when she said in 1988:

> We didn't have feminism also... because feminism in the West really developed an agenda around the issues of the personal as political. But this is adverse to everything which is attractive in East European societies. The reality and the danger is that the private becomes political too often and always. Private life we had and we really would try to stick to it and to enlarge it and not let the political into the private. We have an over-politicized life so we want to defend it.[67]

There is a marked contrast at present between renewed efforts in

Western Europe to promote greater visibility of women in the public sphere of formal politics and the labour market, and the discernible trend in East Central Europe to displace women from the workforce and reinforce their primary responsibility for the private sphere. Indeed, in East Central Europe, many women are welcoming, with a sigh of relief, the opportunity to shed the double or triple burden and 'spend a few years at home with the children'. They wish to indulge a right they never had and imagine Western women enjoying, namely the right to choose whether to go out to work or to stay at home.[68]

In part the rejection of the tractor driver, crane driver, kerchief- or hard-hat wearing labourer image of woman-as-worker is expressed as a positive reclamation of femininity. The widely held view that state socialist 'emancipation' forced women to neglect their maternal role *and* made them unattractive, old before their time, contributes to this sense of women being happy to rediscover their womanhood through their caring role within the family. Miroslava Holubová of the autonomous women's group New Humanity in Prague expressed support for a re-establishment of gender-demarcated role divisions, commenting that men had been 'emasculated' by state socialism and are now blossoming, able to express their masculinity again and to take on responsibility through the entrepreneurial opportunities provided by the market. And women's caring was in her view necessary to the well-being of the family.

Influenced by their cultural heritage, many women in Poland and to an extent in Hungary see their position in the family as one of strength. Historically, in these (until the Second World War) predominantly agrarian societies, women's status was low in public life, but high in the family. Thus some women in East Central Europe consider the need for 'liberation' from this traditionally strong role to be a purely Western concept. They are celebrating their return to the hearth rather than mourning it as defeat or even temporary retreat. From this perspective, current ideology about women's primarily domestic role need not necessarily be interpreted as the state's machiavellian attempt to mask the necessity of making massive cuts in the labour force. Nor does it have to reflect the Catholic Church's restrictive view of women's role in a divinely ordained 'natural' order, nor even nationalism's traditionalist morality and population policies. On the contrary, confinement to the private realm might be re-interpreted by women themselves as offering them space for renewal, and help them in adapting to totally new situations in the aftermath of state socialism.

It should be noted, however, that women's relegation to the hearth is

occurring precisely at the moment when the private sphere has lost the significance it inadvertently gained as a substitute civil society. In other words, at the very moment when women are being once again assigned to the private sphere, it is the public sphere which is being revalued, at least for men. So, while former dissident men move out of grassroots anti-political activity into the glare of public life in the structures of mainstream politics, their female counterparts fade into oblivion. There is an echo here of nineteenth-century public/private demarcation leading to a depreciation of the domestic sphere. And the ideological celebration of hearth and home may hamper recognition on women's part that a newly entrenched public/private split plus female economic dependence will ensure only male and not female autonomy.

Newly embraced traditional attitudes to the family were previewed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the former Soviet Union even before the transition. An international survey on attitudes to women's labour force participation in 1988 showed Hungary to be far more conservative than West European countries. The statement that 'a job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children' was endorsed by 76 per cent of Hungarian respondents (79 per cent of men and 75 per cent of women). While the statement was accepted by 61 per cent of those asked in Austria and 57 per cent in Ireland, the Hungarian figure indicates markedly greater approval for such a traditional attitude to gender roles. The same statement was unambiguously rejected by British, Dutch and American respondents. A clear majority of Hungarian men expressed the view that women should not work outside the home when there were children under school age in the family. But perhaps most striking of all were the 19 per cent of Hungarian men who felt that even before having children, married women should not go out to work at all. In a Polish opinion poll carried out at the end of 1990, 45 per cent of working women's husbands also thought that women should not work outside their homes. This opinion was shared by a high 35 per cent of working women.[69]

Zsuzsa Béres sees women complying, out of exhaustion, with a new nationalistic variant of the patriarchal family:

> Today women are told they must bear more children or else the Hungarian nation will die out ... 'Being told' what to do by people who know better what's good for you than you yourself is what paternalistic socialism was all about. To a majority of Hungary's women today, 'being told' seems to hold out promise of the long-coveted dream: to be provided for forever by men, in the haven of the Holy Family. No more strain, no more sense of guilt.[70]

This ideal model based on the 'family wage' – supported in rhetoric at least by politicians in several East Central European countries – has an air of total unreality about it. Two, and in Poland and Hungary often three, incomes were necessary to maintain the family in the past. The removal of subsidies, and growing inflation make this more, rather than less, true in the present.

In Hungary, young urban families with children are disproportionately represented amongst those falling beneath the poverty line. In these circumstances, as Czech sociologist Hana Navarová notes, the life of young families 'can be characterized as one of constant improvization'. If the past shortage economy made 'institutionally unsecured areas of material needs ... the family's responsibility', today too economic transformation lands the family with problems. Four-fifths of young families in Czechoslovakia, especially those with one child under three, have difficulty meeting their basic material needs, unless they have access to parental help. In this process, uncertainty and ever-increasing 'difficulties with securing the everyday life of the family' have reinforced the traditional family model based on the 'principle of patriarchy'.[71]

As in Western Europe, social policy based on the two-parent family is increasingly obfuscating the reality. The Western-documented phenomenon of the feminization of poverty appears to be taking hold in the societies of Eastern and Central Europe, with lone mothers among the first to become impoverished. Heike Reggentin is the 36-year-old mother of a five-year-old son and a fourteen-year-old daughter in Neustrelitz in the former GDR. When the city administration's central kitchens closed in March 1990, she became unemployed, living for almost two years on a monthly income of DM 690 unemployment assistance plus DM 207 maintenance for the children. In January 1992 she accepted a job for even less, DM 746 take-home pay, cleaning for six hours a day, simply to avoid sitting around at home all day. For her it is a struggle to have 50 pfennig to spare for her son each evening when the ice-cream man comes by her home. 'Bring back the Wall? Sometimes you say that.'[72]

Older women are also particularly prone to poverty, since under state socialism they retired five years earlier than men but have approximately seven years' longer life expectancy. Because of their lower wages, they also form a disproportionate percentage of those on the minimum pension, and perhaps in part because of their duties as grandmothers, they are less likely than men to become re-employed.[73]

While female poverty and domestic violence are on the increase, it seems paradoxically that divorce and the birthrate are both set to

decrease in the face of material insecurity and women's widespread loss of independent earning power. Reports from the former GDR and from Moscow speak of women now refraining from divorce proceedings and also of an 'unofficial birthstrike'.[74]

The family's role is at one and the same time being devalued in relation to the public sphere, and enhanced in the search for identity and meaning following the collapse of state socialism. Simultaneously this process is focusing, in its rejection of state socialist notions of egalitarianism and social justice, on individualist enterprise in the market, and autonomy and creativity within the family.

These processes too are marked by contradictions. On the one hand, the search for identity posits the family as the individual unit within the wider ethnic group. Ironically, given the individualism that lies at the heart of liberal views of the family, this is accompanied by an explicit rejection on the part of the Polish Catholic Church of individualism as naked self-interest or greed, in the name of support for the notion of ethnic or national solidarity.

On his 1991 visit to Poland, the Pope deplored individualism as unsuitable for Poland, contrasting the strong traditional values of community and family with the false collectivism of state socialism. The Ministers for Health and Justice, both members of the conservative Christian National Association, were quoted in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 19 June 1991 as praising the Pope's defence of unborn life and the unity of the family against 'individualistic' tendencies to put private happiness above the collective good. They saw the Pope's defence of private property and entrepreneurial initiative as bound up with human dignity and the consolidation of the family as well as with economic efficiency. Such a line of argumentation treats women and the family as coterminous. Some Polish feminists have reacted by stressing the value of individualism. They insist that women should have the right to develop their potential as opposed to being subordinated to the family, as envisaged by this 'clerical collectivist authoritarianism'.[75] Neo-liberal market ideology is as adept as was nineteenth-century liberal theory at reconciling individualism with a 'natural' gender-based division of labour.

Furthermore, there is an uncanny resemblance between Tönnies's notion of the household and women's role within it as constituent elements of the *Gemeinschaft* – a community based on 'natural' social relations of kinship and neighbourhood of which 'the outstanding example' is the rural village community – and current visions of women's role in the private sphere, situated within an idealized rural

past.[76] Current East Central European desires to annihilate the immediate past and escape from society's problems in the transformation process into the myth of traditional community are equivalent to an abandonment of modern society itself, of the real in favour of the romantic.

The parallels between current discourse on women's domestic mission and the public/private divide as exemplified in Tönnies's ideas of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, make it clear that new definitions of national identity which rest on the counterposing of private and public, natural and cultural, female and male, in practice weaken women's citizenship rights within the public sphere. The attacks on reproductive rights discussed in the next chapter seem to exemplify this. Mounted in the interests of raising the nation's birthrate, they are ostensibly part and parcel of just such a quest to establish new national moral and ethical norms. Moreover, such moves to abrogate women's right to a termination of pregnancy are being made by male-dominated, albeit democratically elected, governments.

Notes

1. Olga Nikolaevitch, the first-person narrator, research assistant and harassed mother in Natalya Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other*, trans. Pieta Monks, Virago Press, London, 1989, pp. 5–8, 49.
2. Eva Hauserová, 'The Cult of Motherhood', in: *Prague Post*, 22–30 March 1992, and reprinted in: *Everywoman*, July/August 1991, pp. 20–21.
3. Olga Lipovskaya, 'New Women's Organizations', in: Mary Buckley, ed., *Perestroika and Soviet Women*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 72.
4. See for example Elemér Hankiss who, in discussing Hungary, describes 'atomization as a basic feature of early socialist (Stalinist, totalitarian) societies' which 'has been analysed by many in detail, beginning with Hannah Arendt's study of totalitarianism', in: Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 33.
5. Hungarian sociologist Júlia Szalai writes: 'there is a strong and broad opposition in our countries to everything that has the slightest flavour of "statism". It is a long process to get rid of the idea and practice of the totalitarian state and to define a state that is "ours", that is created and controlled by the democratic processes of the civil society,' in: Bob Deacon and Júlia Szalai, eds, *Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist Welfare?*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1990, pp. 34–35.
6. 'Entrance into the socialist labour force was not merely a financial issue, but a matter of social membership as well. Eligibility rights based on citizenship were substituted by ones based on having regular and continuous employment, now the only way of gaining access to basic services like child care, medical care, family allowances, sick benefits, or pensions.' Júlia Szalai, 'Some Aspects of the Changing Situation of Women in Hungary', in: *Signs*, vol. 17, no. 1, autumn 1991, p. 153.
7. For a discussion of the shift from private to public patriarchy, and women's dependence on the welfare state, see Helga Maria Hernes, 'Women and the Welfare State: The Transition from Private to Public Dependence', and Anette Borchorst and Birte Siim, 'Women and the Advanced Welfare State – A New Kind of Patriarchal

Power?' both in: Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., *Women and the State: The Shifting Boundaries of Public and Private*, Century Hutchinson, London, 1987.
8. Crescy Cannan, 'Active and Inactive Citizens in Europe's Welfare States: The Legacy and Contribution of Beveridge', in: John Jacobs and Peter Squires, eds, *Beveridge 1942–1992*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1992. See also Stephan Leibfried and Ilona Ostner, 'The Particularism of West German Welfare Capitalism: The Case of Women's Social Security', in: Michael Adler et al., eds, *The Sociology of Social Security*, Edinburgh U.P., Edinburgh, 1991, pp. 175–76; and Gösta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990.
9. Prue Chamberlayne, 'Focus on *Volkssolidarität* (VS)', in: *Community Development Journal*, vol. 27, no. 2, April 1992, p. 154, in the second case citing Mary Langan and Ilona Ostner, 'Gender and Welfare: Towards a Comparative Framework', in: G. Room, ed., *European Developments in Social Policy*, SAUS, Bristol, 1991.
10. Mária Adamik, 'Hungary: A Loss of Rights?', in: *Shifting Territories: Feminism in Europe*, special issue no. 39 of *Feminist Review*, winter 1991, p. 170.
11. Szalai, 'Some Aspects', 1991.
12. Wendy Bracewell, 'Problems of Gender and Nationalism', ms. 1992.
13. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association*, (English translation of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* by Charles Loomis), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955, reprinted 1974, pp. 45–46. I am indebted to Katherine O'Donovan's book *Sexual Divisions in Law* for alerting me to the relevance of Tönnies's work in connection with the public/private divide. She should not, however, be held in any way responsible for the way I have applied Tönnies's ideas to current processes of social transformation in East Central Europe.
14. Tönnies, ibid., pp. 174–75, 186.
15. Obviously this was more true of professional women than others. Many women worked in unfulfilling jobs for poor wages, motivated primarily by the necessity of a second income to maintain the family.
16. Zsuzsa Béres, 'A Thousand Words on Hungarian Women', published in: *Budapest Week*, March 1991 and reprinted in: *Trouble and Strife*, issue 23, 1991.
17. This leave comprised five weeks annually in the former GDR as compared with five days in West Germany, until the child's eighth birthday only. (See Eva Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, Berg, Oxford, 1989, p. 71; Sabine Berghahn and Andrea Fritzsche, *Frauenrecht in Ost und West Deutschland* (*Law Relating to Women in East and West Germany*), Basisdruck Verlag, Berlin, 1991, p. 101.) As of 1990, this sick leave could be taken by either the father or the mother in Czechoslovakia and the then Soviet Union, and comprised seven working days and seven calendar days respectively for every illness of a child under 10 and under 14 respectively. In Poland, mothers of young children were entitled to 30 working days annually. (Source: Alena Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings in Central and East European Countries', Paper prepared for Tripartite Symposium on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment for Men and Women in Employment in Industrialized Countries, Prague, May 1990.) For the change in the Polish regulations, see Jolanta Plakwicz, 'Between Church and State: Polish Women's Experience', in: Chris Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Scarlet Press, London, 1992, p. 83.
18. Sources: for the provisions governing such leave in Hungary, which in recent years was available to mothers *or* fathers, see Kroupová, ibid.; for the time spent absent from work, see Mária Adamik, 'Hungary – Supporting Parenting and Child Rearing: Policy Innovation in Eastern Europe', in: Sheila Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, eds, *Child Care, Parental Leave, and the Under Threes: Policy Innovation in Europe*, Auburn House, New York and London, 1991, pp. 115–45.
19. Gwyn E. Edwards, *GDR Society and Institutions*, Macmillan, London, 1985, p. 47.
20. Report of the Central Committee of the SED to the Ninth Party Congress in 1976.
21. Barbara Einhorn, 'Socialist Emancipation: The Women's Movement in the GDR', in: Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, Marilyn B. Young, eds, *Promissory Notes: Women in the*

Transition to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1989, pp. 288–90, 303, notes 13, 19; Edwards, *GDR Society*, 1985, p. 39.

22. Edwards, ibid., pp. 54–56.

23. For an analysis of children's primers, see Barbara Einhorn, 'Emancipated Women or Hardworking Mothers? Women in the Former GDR', in: Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, 1992, pp. 142–43.

24. It is worthy of note that GDR public discourse did not adopt the linguistic suffix introduced to West German discourse by the Greens and feminists, which makes occupational denotations encompass both sexes.

25. One of the targets of anti-militarist campaigning by the GDR Frauen für den Frieden (Women for Peace) in the early 1980s was the glorification of the 'peace-keeping' role of the army evident in these texts. Both books praise the 'workers' of the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee – NVA), and the first school reader encourages classes to 'adopt' and correspond with a member of the army.

26. Sources: (for Hungary) Katalin Koncz, 'Results and Tensions of Female Employment in Hungary', mimeo, 1987; (for Poland) Renata Siemieńska, 'Women's Issues in the Transitional Period in Poland', mimeo, 1991; (for the former GDR) Gunnar Winkler, ed., *Sozialreport 90*, Verlag die Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1990, pp. 269–73.

27. For figures on time spent on domestic chores, see Table A2 in the Appendix. On the relatively little time spent on childcare, Hungarian women spent an average of 26 minutes in 1976–77 compared with 12 minutes for men of the total 4h. 16m. and 1h. 04m. respectively; or 1h. 2m. by married women with two children plus 5h. 13m. per day on household tasks (Barnabás Barta, András Klinger, Károly Miltényi and György Vukorich, 'Female Labour Force Participation and Fertility in Hungary', in: Valentina Bodrova and Richard Anker, eds, *Working Women in Socialist Countries*, ILO, Geneva, 1985, tables 29, 30, pp. 52–53). In Poland in 1984, married women with children spent 5h. 55m. per day on household chores compared with 1h. 39m. for men (figures supplied by Renata Siemieńska, from Analysis of Time Budget of Polish Population, mimeo, 1987, p. 60).

28. Valentina Bodrova and Richard Anker, *Working Women in Socialist Countries: The Fertility Connection*, 1985, tables 4, 53, 54, pp. 9, 85.

29. These findings for the former GDR are taken from Hildegard Maria Nickel, 'Ein perfektes Drehbuch: Geschlechtertrennung durch Arbeit und Sozialisation', (A Perfect Screenplay: Gender Division by Work and Socialization) in: Gislinde Schwarz and Christine Zenner, eds, *Wir wollen mehr als ein 'Vaterland'* (We Want More than a 'Fatherland'), Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg, 1990, pp. 80–81.

30. Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings', 1990. For figures on the leisure time available to men and women, see Table A2 in the Appendix. See also Susan Poiznèr, 'The Sorrows of Mother Russia', in the *Guardian*, 30 June 1992. She cites a figure of 31.7 hours per week spent by women on childcare and household chores. Ellen Hume, 'Perestroika Leaves Women in the Political Cold', in the *Guardian*, 22 December 1990, spoke of Soviet women waiting in queues 2½ hours per day for food and other staples.

31. Gwyn Edwards cites evidence that in the former GDR, 'half of the mothers are socially active' (Edwards, *GDR Society*, 1985, p. 32).

32. See Gislinde Schwarz and Christine Zenner, 'Ursprünglich war da mal eine Frau', ('In the Beginning There was a Woman') in: Schwarz and Zenner, eds, *Wir wollen mehr als ein 'Vaterland'*, 1990, p. 12.

33. Béres, 'A Thousand Words', 1991.

34. A. Alvarez, 'Terror: A Muse without Shelf Life', in: the *Guardian*, 21.11.92.

35. Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other*, 1989, pp. 1–2, 23.

36. Vera Golubeva from Archangelsk in Russia describes everyday life for women in the northern provinces in: Tatyana Mamonova, ed., *Women and Russia: Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 27.

37. Irmtraud Morgner's 'Das Seil' ('The Tightrope') is an integral part of her novel *Leben und Abenteuer der Trobadora Beatriz nach Zeugnissen ihrer Spielfrau Laura* (*The Life and Adventures of the Female Troubadour Beatriz, According to the Testimony of Her Accompanist Laura*), Aufbau Verlag, Berlin and Weimar, 1974. The story was published in abridged form in English as 'The Rope', transl. Karin R. Achberger, in: Edith H. Altbach et al., eds, *German Feminism: Readings in Politics and Literature*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984, pp. 215–19.

38. Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other*, 1989, p. 53.

39. In Czechoslovakia, there were 32 divorces for every 100 marriages (Source: Hana Navarová, 'The Lives of Young Families in Czechoslovakia', English version as mimeo, 1990, p. 3). One in three marriages failed in the Soviet Union. In the former GDR, 38% of all marriages ended in divorce (Source: Gunnar Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*, Verlag Die Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1990, pp. 109, 111). In Hungary there were 44 divorces for every 100 marriages (Source: Chris Corrin, 'Magyar Women's Lives: Complexities and Contradictions', in: Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, 1992, p. 49).

40. On the link between the relatively low rate of divorce and Catholic mores, see Plakwicz, 'Between Church and State', in: Corrin, ibid.

41. In Hungary, for example, the divorce rate soared, from 11.4 per 100 marriages in 1948 to 44 per 100 in 1988. In Czechoslovakia too the rate of divorces per 100 marriages grew from 9.8 in 1950 to 14.4 in 1960, 19.7 in 1970, 28.7 in 1980, and 32 in 1985. Sources: Corrin, ibid.; Navarová, 'The Lives of Young Families', 1990.

42. GDR statistics in: Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*, 1990, pp. 29, 103. For the Perm survey, see Hilary Pilkington, 'Behind the Mask of Soviet Unity: Realities of Women's Lives', in: Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, 1992, pp. 213–14.

43. In 1988 only around 40% of young men and women in the GDR felt sure that they would marry. This represented a marked drop from the 75% who expressed this certainty about marriage in 1982 (Winkler, ed., *Sozialreport 90*, pp. 35, 271, 276). In Czechoslovakia, marriage was the 'main aim of 60–70% of young women and about 40% of young men' interviewed in 1988 (Navarová, 'The Lives of Young Families', 1990).

44. The average age upon marriage in Czechoslovakia was 21.5 for women, and 24 for men (Navarová, ibid., 1990). In the former GDR it rose during the 1980s from 21.3 to 22.7 for women and from 23.4 to 24.8 for men (Winkler, ibid., p. 32).

45. Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (1987), Hutchinson, London, 1992, p. 107.

46. An old joke which links supply-side shortages of consumer durables with the power of tradesmen in state socialism goes as follows: A man goes to the garage and says 'I'd like to order a new Skoda (or Lada, or Trabant, or Moskvitch)'. 'A brand new Skoda?' 'Yes, a brand new one.' 'Ah yes,' is the reply, 'well, that will take a very long time.' 'How long?' enquires the customer. 'Twenty-five years, I'm afraid.' 'Twenty-five years *exactly*?' the customer presses. 'Yes, precisely twenty-five years,' comes back the answer. 'Morning or afternoon?' he pursues the question further. 'Why do you ask?' 'Because I've got the plumber coming in the morning.' Bearing in mind that jokes thrive on exaggeration, this one expresses an objective as well as a subjective reality of life under state socialism.

47. Charlotte Worgitzky, 'Hänsel und Gretel: Kein Märchen' ('Hansel and Gretel: Not a Fairy Tale'), in: Worgitzky, *Vieräugig oder blind* (*With Two Pairs of Eyes or Blind*), Buchverlag Der Morgen, Berlin, 1978, pp. 133–47 [translations mine, BE].

48. Angela Stachowa, 'Und der steinerne Elefant' ('And the Stone Elephant'), in: Stachowa, *Stunde zwischen Hund und Katz* (*Twilight Hour*), Mitteldeutscher Verlag, Halle (Saale), 1976, pp. 189–92 [translations mine, BE].

49. Ekaterina Alexandrova's testimony, 'Why Soviet Women Want to Get Married' is in: Mamonova, *Women and Russia*, 1984, pp. 31–33.

50. Tatyana was quoted by Francine Du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women Walking the Tightrope*, Virago, London, 1991, pp. 59–60. The Azerbaijan survey is cited by Pilkington, 'Behind the Mask of Soviet Unity', in: Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, 1992, p. 213.

51. Hungarian data cited by Corrin, 'Magyar Women's Lives', in: Corrin, ed.,

Superwomen and the Double Burden, 1992, p. 50. On the importance of housing in Poland, see also the article in the *Guardian*, 29.9.92.

52. (On the former Soviet Union) Du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women Walking the Tightrope*, 1991, p. 54; (on Czechoslovakia) Hana Navarová, 'The Lives of Young Families', 1990; and 'Woman and Family, Woman in the Family', in: Marie Čermáková, Irena Hradecká, Hana Navarová, *K postavení žen v československé společnosti* (*The Situation of Women in Czechoslovak Society*), publication of the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1991; (on Hungary) Corrin, ibid., 1992, p. 50.

53. (For Poland) Ewa Gontarczyk-Wesoła, interview with Barbara Einhorn, Poznań, April 1990; (for Czechoslovakia) Navarová, 'Lives of Young Families', 1990; (for Hungary) Eminent philosopher and academician Éva Ancsel, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Budapest, May 1990; and Corrin, ibid., 1992, p. 52; (for the Soviet Union) Du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women Walking the Tightrope*, 1991, p. 54; and Ekaterina Alexandrova, 'Why Soviet Women Want to Get Married', 1984, p. 39.

54. Zsuzsa Ferge, 'Unemployment in Hungary: The Need for a New Ideology', in: Bob Deacon, ed., *Social Policy, Social Justice and Citizenship in Eastern Europe*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1992, pp. 158–59.

55. For an elaboration of this 'innovation of Kádarism', see Júlia Szalai, 'Social Participation in Hungary in the Context of Restructuring and Liberalization', in: Deacon, ed., ibid., 1992, pp. 42ff.

56. Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed*, 1992, pp. 91–92.

57. Zsuzsa Ferge is quoted by Chris Corrin, 'The Situation of Women in Hungarian Society', in: Bob Deacon and Júlia Szalai, eds, *Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist Welfare?*, 1990, p. 189. For an analysis of the 'second' economy, its main spheres of activity, its contribution to household incomes and estimated participation rates, see Szalai, 'Social Participation in Hungary', in: Deacon, ed., *Social Policy, Social Justice and Citizenship in Eastern Europe*, 1992, pp. 42–45.

58. Renata Siemieńska, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, 31.3.90; Mira Marody, 'Why I Am Not a Feminist', ms. 1992; and Marody, 'Perception of Politics in Polish Society', in: *Social Research*, vol. 57, no. 2, summer 1990, p. 268.

59. Elżbieta Tarkowska and Jacek Tarkowski, 'Social Disintegration in Poland: Civil Society or Amoral Familism?', in: *Telos*, no. 89, fall 1991, pp. 103–109; Bożena Umińska, 'The Portrayal of Women in Polish Literature', ms., 1991.

60. Mira Marody, 'On Polish Political Attitudes', in: *Telos*, no. 89, fall 1991, pp. 112–13.

61. Tarkowska and Tarkowski, 'Social Disintegration in Poland: Civil Society or Amoral Familism?', 1991.

62. Anna Titkow, cited by Plakwicz, 'Between Church and State', 1992, p. 81.

63. Steven Lukes, *On Individualism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1973, pp. 63, 66, 123. I am indebted to Katherine O'Donovan's book *Sexual Divisions in Law* for alerting me to the relevance of the ideas of John Stuart Mill and Steven Lukes on privacy as a precondition for individual freedom. Obviously she cannot be held responsible for what I have made of these ideas in this context.

64. Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought*, Princeton U.P., Princeton, and Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981, pp. 135–45.

65. Katherine O'Donovan points out that 'the ideology of equality which nineteenth-century women relied on in their struggle against discriminatory laws and practices which denied them access to education and employment was formal equality. . . . The interaction between private and public and the consequent restraints on freedom were ignored. Hidden behind the rhetoric of equality were issues of whether to recognize in the public sphere needs which arise out of the private. This continues today. The conflict reformers face between the values of individualism in the market-place and community in the family has been managed hitherto through reliance on the language of freedom of contract and formal equality'. Feminist scholars have also sought to explode the dichotomy behind the

liberal concept of private and public defined as 'areas of activity and behaviour unregulated or regulated by law' (ibid., pp. 3, 160).

66. For an elaboration of a range of feminist critiques of the public/private divide, see Carol Pateman, *The Disorder of Women*, Polity, London, 1989, pp. 118–141.

67. Zsuzsa Ferge, in: Deacon and Szalai, eds, *Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe*, 1990, p. 43.

68. It is difficult for women in the former state socialist countries to realize that most Western women can no more afford this choice than they could – or can. Similarly, in relation to paid work they tend, understandably after years of juggling full-time work and family, to idealize the choice of working part-time or at home, little knowing that these forms of work are often poorly paid, exploitative and lacking in social protection in the West.

69. The survey was carried out in seven countries, of which Hungary was the only state socialist country, with a representative sample of 1700. It was analysed by Olga Tóth, in 'Conservative Gender Roles and Women's Work', her paper presented at the Conference of the Hungarian Sociological Association, Budapest, June 1991. Opposition to women working outside the home when there were children under school age in the family was expressed by 58% of Hungarian men. The percentage of men in other countries who felt that married women should not go out to work at all ranged from 3% in Britain and the Netherlands to 11% in Italy.

The Polish opinion poll is reported by Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, 'Women in Poland: Choices to be Made', in: *Shifting Territories*, 1991, p. 184. In the former Soviet Union too, a 1990 opinion poll registered a 'tendency . . . to strengthen the ideology of women's "natural destination"' when 35.8% of those polled supported the idea that 'it is time to make women return home to the family'. This result also showed a discrepancy between men and women, with only 30.8% of female, but 41.8% of male respondents endorsing this view. The poll was analysed by Valentina V. Bodrova, 'Women, Work, Family in the Mirror of Public Opinion', in: Valentine Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies*, OUP Clarendon Series, Oxford, 1993.

70. Béres, 'A Thousand Words', 1991.

71. Hana Navarová, 'The Lives of Young Families', 1990; and 'Woman and Family, Woman in the Family', in: *K postavení žen v československé společnosti*, 1991.

72. Heike Reggentin was quoted in *Der Spiegel*, no. 24, 1992, p. 101.

73. Jiřina Siklová, 'Women and Ageing Under Real Socialism', in Deacon and Szalai, *Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe*, 1990, pp. 192–200.

74. The remark about an unofficial birthstrike was made by Christiane Schindler, spokesperson for the Independent Women's Association (UFV) in the former GDR. See the *Guardian*, 1 May 1992, on empty Moscow labour wards; and the *Guardian*, 4 February 1992, on the decreasing German birthrate and the need to import labour massively by the end of the century, ironic postscript to the German hostility to refugees and asylum seekers at present.

75. Nina Gladziuk, interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, 19.6.91.

76. In the introduction to his translation of Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association* (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*) p. xii, Charles P. Loomis points out that although these twin concepts denote 'ideal types', they can be used to compare 'various groups in a given period, or in different periods of history'.