

Cinderella Goes to Market

Citizenship, Gender and Women's
Movements in East Central Europe



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Right or Duty? Women and the Economy

Socialism liberated women from wage exploitation *and* enslaved them by compelling them to work. But the end of socialism hasn't meant gains for women. We fear that we will lose maternity leave *and* our jobs.

Lolita Alimova, Samarkand¹

Paid employment has been the norm for women in East Central Europe for the past forty years. Now they are the first to be dismissed. A West German commentator has suggested that most of them will never work again. Indeed the idea that around 90 per cent of women of working age could be economically active was simply 'unrealistic'. In Western Europe, less than 50 per cent of working-age women are economically active. This level is 'normal'.²

Why do women currently form the majority of the unemployed in many of these countries? In 1990, Czech National Assembly delegate Dr Moserová saw a paradox here: it would seem obvious that the unwieldy heavy industry conglomerates with their outmoded machinery, top-heavy administrative structures and male-dominated workforce would be prime candidates for closure – as would the open-cast mines which have transformed parts of Bohemia into a moonscape of environmental devastation. Yet it was textiles – together with glassware (and armaments) Czechoslovakia's best export – with a heavily female-dominated workforce, which were the first to go under in the process of marketization. Dr Moserová claimed that without the female textile workers, Czechoslovakia would have gone bankrupt in the past. Deafened by machine noise and with ulcerated legs from standing at their work stations, these women had kept the country alive, she maintained, at high cost to themselves.

Yet women in the former state socialist countries are not objecting vociferously to their high redundancy levels. They fail to see their jobs as an unambiguous benefit worth defending. What, then, did labour force participation mean to women in East Central Europe? For many of them, the right to work was degraded by state compulsion into an obligation to be endured. It subjected them to the rigours of the double burden – long days, exhaustion, feelings of guilt and inadequacy towards their children, lack of career satisfaction. Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, former leader of Solidarity's Women's Section and current president of Amnesty International in Poland, maintains that 'the motivation for most of them was not the hope of fulfilling career ambitions or the intention of being financially independent but a much more mundane need to make ends meet'.³ Their attitude was therefore marked by ambivalence and hesitation.

So what was wrong with the worker-mother? Chapter 2 examined the persistently unequal gendered power relations within the family. An analysis of the woman-as-worker side of the equation may help to illuminate women's current lack of enthusiasm for the right to work. Did the problem originate in their conditions of employment? In patterns of occupational segregation within the workforce? Or in the very fact of the onerous double burden?

It is not clear whether state socialism's ideological emphasis on women's labour force participation demonstrated commitment to women's 'emancipation', as they called it, or simple expediency dictated by economic need and demographic imbalances. Whatever the state's intentions, the meaning of work obviously differed for individual women, depending on whether they worked in a profession, or performed physically strenuous or repetitive unskilled work on the production line. Even within state socialism's reductionist paradigm which equated labour force participation with women's emancipation, there were yawning gaps between rhetoric and reality. Legislation for, and the implementation of, equality of opportunity in education and vocational training, women's rights at the workplace, or equal pay for work of equal value, were very different matters. And what got irretrievably lost by state socialism was the need to ameliorate the conditions of work. Rather than humanizing the social relations of production for *all* workers, they promulgated compensatory protective legislation.⁴ This emphasized women's reproductive function rather than their productive capacities, thus entrenching the worker-mother duality. It is not surprising that women are now reacting in such disparate ways to current economic

and ideological pressures pushing them out of the workforce.

Socialist feminists and many others in the West have seen labour force participation as a necessary (if not sufficient, as in the crude state socialist model) precondition for the achievement not only of economic independence, but of improved status, meaningful social contacts, job fulfilment and through these, both an enhanced life experience and a greater sense of self-esteem, a more autonomous self-image. Western socialist feminists have also stressed the importance of analysing the gendered stratification of the workforce.

Both the life-enhancing and the discriminatory aspects of paid work make an analysis of the impact of labour force participation on at least two generations of women in East Central Europe all the more compelling. Was their working life an integral part of their self-image? Did they in fact achieve economic independence? If so, did this give them greater autonomy in terms of decision-making? Did they enjoy a better social status than women in Western Europe? Did they have an enhanced self-esteem? In short, were they autonomous subjects more able to articulate their needs and aspirations, and to act on their own behalf, than their Western sisters? Or did they suffer from 'too much' emancipation,⁵ wearing themselves out prematurely in the effort to achieve a seamless integration of their two roles? Were they stretched on a rack of eternal guilt about their shortcomings in both, their inadequacies as mother and lack of perfection as worker?

The double load is currently being lightened by confining women to their maternal role, supplanting the Janus-headed worker-mother with the doleful visage of the suffering mother. Current ideology has underwritten the economy's need to shed labour in the transition to the market by reintroducing the notion of the 'family wage'. Opinion polls in the former Soviet Union showed support for this notion, espoused too by the Hungarian Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and (although not implemented!) by Solidarity in Poland under Wałęsa.⁶ Interviews conducted by this author reveal a widespread subjective tendency on the part of women themselves to reinterpret their redundancy as the embodiment of a 'choice' previously unknown, enabling them to spend time at home with the children. Yet in the longer term, confining the parameters of female rights and duties to the private domain curtails women's freedom in terms of choice about the ways in which they wish to develop their potential. It also undermines their ability to exercise citizenship rights in the public sphere of work and politics.

Levels of Labour Force Participation

Under state socialism, female labour force participation was extremely high, with women accounting on average for 45–51 per cent of the total labour force in 1989–90. Over 70 per cent of women of working age were employed or undergoing vocational training. This number reached more than 91 per cent in the former GDR in 1989, as compared with 55 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). There was a dramatic growth in the numbers of women who were economically active during the state socialist period, providing a marked contrast with the figures for Western Europe.⁷ While there was also a substantial increase in the numbers of economically active women in some Western European countries during the post-Second World War period, the figures remained both significantly lower than those in Eastern Europe, and crucially differentiated in one important respect. The great majority of women in East Central Europe worked full-time, whereas the growth in female labour force participation in, say, Britain and West Germany has been due largely to increases in part-time work.⁸

The reasons for the past predominance of full-time work among economically active women in East Central Europe were twofold. There was considerable government pressure for this, since the decimation of the male population in the Second World War and the inefficiencies of socialist production combined to produce ongoing labour shortages, exacerbated in the case of the GDR by people escaping to the West. The demographic imbalance which favoured, indeed required, women's employment was then perpetuated by the subsequent downward trend in the birthrate, itself influenced by women's double burden of full-time work and household responsibilities.

A second reason for full-time work dominating female employment was the necessity in most East Central European countries for at least two wages in order to fulfil basic household needs, despite subsidies on rents, public transport and many essential foodstuffs and clothing items, especially children's clothing. Financial pressure was especially acute for the high number of female-headed households in these countries, resulting from the almost uniformly high divorce rate discussed in Chapter 2.

Despite this double, material and ideological pressure, however, many women longed for the opportunity to work part-time in order to combine with greater ease their paid employment and their domestic role. This desire is evident, for instance, in the preference for part-time work expressed by a substantial proportion of women workers,

concurrent with a marked increase in the number of women actually working part-time, in Czechoslovakia between 1986 and 1989.⁹

Natalya Baranskaya's novella *A Week Like Any Other*¹⁰ provides a graphic example of the way work time was invaded by a collective self-help system devised to ease, by sharing, the difficult feat of acquiring scarce foodstuffs. The time-consuming tasks of standing in the queue, and dragging home heavily laden shopping bags, were overwhelmingly performed by women. Travel alone takes three hours per day for the young working mothers in Baranskaya's novella. And time-budget studies have verified this fictional account of the fact that women enjoyed far less leisure time for relaxation, further study, or recreational activities than men.

In fact, women in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union worked longer hours than anywhere else in the world, taking into account their paid work time and the time spent on household tasks. And in terms of hours worked per week, the gender gap was greater in those countries than in any other industrialized region of the world. Despite men's higher participation in the second economy – in, for example, Poland or Hungary – the enormous differential in time spent on domestic labour meant that women worked on average seven hours more per week than men.¹¹

Furthermore, state socialist régimes exerted considerable pressure on women to involve themselves in the wider concerns of society. This meant participation in local or central government, union politics, school or neighbourhood committees. The resulting triple burden caused severe stress, overburdening women to the point that it is understandable if many of them perceived – or perceive, in retrospect – the right to work as yet another obligation, rather than a right on which they might pride themselves.

There were both benefits and costs in state socialism's emphasis on female labour force participation. However, the need to shed labour in the current economic restructuring process will tend to render anachronistic the notion of paid work as the norm for women. Relegation to primary responsibility for the family will inevitably have profound repercussions. Not only will it undermine women's economic independence, it is also likely to have adverse effects on their self-esteem and their perception of their role in society. This in turn must have ramifications for gender relations within the family, as well as attitudinal and behavioural implications for the education of the next generation. What was the reality behind the much-vaunted pre-1989 levels of women's education?

Education and Training

Would-be investors in the newly marketizing economies of East Central Europe have noted with surprise the high level of training and education of the workforce. This was particularly true of the female labour force compared with levels in Western Europe. Equal access to tertiary education was attained by young women in the Soviet Union and East Central Europe much earlier than women in Western Europe or the USA. Ireneusz Bialecki and Barbara Heyns document the fact that university training in Eastern and Central Europe was close to 50 per cent female by the early 1970s, but that 'it took the more economically "developed" West at least a decade longer'.¹² Such a high level of education among the female workforce would appear to lend credence to state socialism's genuine commitment to 'emancipating' women, rather than simply requiring their labour power.

The opposite case is put by Hungarian sociologist Júlia Szalai. She argues that women's involvement in the labour force was actually necessitated by state policies making it a prerequisite for 'access to social services', indeed that 'eligibility rights based on citizenship were substituted by ones based on having regular and continuous employment'.¹³ In addition, it has already been noted that the 'two-earner family model' was an 'economic imperative' owing to the fact that most men did not earn a 'family wage'. Hence women's labour force participation during the state socialist period could not be regarded as 'fully voluntary'. Indeed Mária Ladó claims that 'for the past four decades there has not been any real choice for women'.¹⁴

Nor is the general observation that the female workforce in East Central Europe was highly qualified without its problems. On the one hand, women were generally better educated than men, and by 1985 even outnumbered men at post-secondary educational institutions in Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Poland.¹⁵ On the other, it can be shown that most women were employed in jobs involving lower skill levels and commanding lower pay than men. This statement was true to a differing degree of most state socialist countries and raises the question: did the socialist state foster women's education as a means to 'emancipation', or with the more narrowly expedient perspective of a well-qualified workforce as the precondition for increased productivity?

In the former GDR, all schooling was gender neutral, with a unified compulsory curriculum throughout the ten to twelve years of schooling. In the early years, girls were encouraged to enter technical colleges and scientific and mathematical disciplines at university. High numbers of

female students in economics, the natural sciences and mathematics in the mid- to late 1980s across all of East Central Europe show the success of this policy.¹⁶ Once at work, there was positive discrimination in favour of women, at least in the GDR case, with Measures for the Promotion of Women (*Frauenförderungsmaßnahmen*) enabling them to improve their qualifications by attending further education or training courses on day release from their jobs or on other paid leave schemes. This meant that by 1988 in East Germany, 'entry-level skill or professional qualifications had reached gender balance in age cohorts up to age forty'.¹⁷

In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other hand, secondary schooling remained divided along traditional lines between technical and humanities-based schools. The fact that boys tended to enter technical schools whilst girls opted for the humanities meant that gender imbalances were already entrenched at the point of entry to the labour market. Boys began their working lives after completing some form of vocational training integral to their schooling, while girls, despite relatively higher levels of general education, entered the workforce as unskilled labour.

Bialecki and Heyns have illustrated this trend in their study of educational policy and practice in Poland. They argue that the high levels of female educational attainment, and indeed the feminization of many professions, happened by default. Because class and not gender was prioritized in state socialism's form of egalitarianism, these outcomes were actually the unintended by-product of educational policies formulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s to expand technical and vocational education for the proletariat and the peasantry.¹⁸ The fact that increases in vocational education were most evident among males from a working class or rural background reinforced the gender imbalance in the skilled workforce.

Júlia Szalai confirms the same pattern for Hungary, where girls chose 'less vocational, more academic forms of secondary education' and hence entered the workforce less skilled than boys. She argues that 'women provided the great bulk of investment-saving semi-skilled and unskilled labour: their proportion in this segment of the labour force doubled from 27 per cent in 1949 to 54 per cent in 1984', while unskilled and semi-skilled jobs had 'dropped to 31 per cent of total available jobs by 1990. ... Even now, as many as 37 per cent of women in the workforce are unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In other words, despite their rising level of education, women were ... heavily over-represented in the least skilled segments of the labour market.'

Under new market conditions, these basic patterns are borne out. The high proportion of women among unskilled and semi-skilled workers is reflected in Hungarian unemployment statistics for May 1992, according to which women form 41 per cent of the total unemployed, but 40 per cent of unskilled and 54.5 per cent of semi-skilled workers who are unemployed. This imbalance also contributes to wage differentials, since it reinforces 'the prevailing dominance of men in well-paid, more mobile jobs in all industries, whereas women (even with broader, though less job-oriented education) are increasingly caught in the lower-paid, more monotonous blue- and white-collar jobs'.¹⁹

The fact that women were if anything over-represented in tertiary level education is also two-edged. Polish sociologist Renata Siemieńska points out that there was under state socialism little motivation for men to go to university (for which the humanities-based secondary school or lyceum formed the prerequisite). The industrial bias of state socialist countries meant that a man's earning potential was far more favourable as a skilled blue-collar worker than as a university graduated professional. In Poland, what was seen as the 'excessive' feminization of medicine resulted in the imposition of quotas favouring male medical students. Yet comparable quotas were never applied to encourage men to enter other traditionally feminized professions such as nursing or the care of young children. These quotas were removed after they were successfully challenged as discriminatory by the Ombudsman in 1987.²⁰ In East Germany too, girls' higher performance at secondary level and the ensuing disproportion of women entering universities had caused the introduction of a form of positive discrimination to boost the numbers of boys gaining university places.

The high proportion of female university students was common to all the former state socialist countries. This in turn explains the phenomenon of women dominating the lower levels of academic and particularly research positions – a large sector of the labour force in the state socialist countries – as well as such occupations as sociologist, psychologist, editor, journalist. And a disproportionate number of students in humanities subjects and teacher training were women.²¹ In Czechoslovakia for example, a Civic Forum spokeswoman for higher education stated in 1990 that women comprised 80 per cent of students in Arts Faculties and 90 per cent of those studying education.

Despite the high level of general education among young women, there is evidence that even before 1989, many of them tended to opt for training in occupations traditionally deemed 'suitable for girls' or seen

as 'women's work'. It seems therefore that educational means alone do not necessarily guarantee the overcoming of gender-specific stereotypes and preconceptions about work. In the former GDR for example, in 1987 over 60 per cent of female school leavers opted for training in a mere 16 out of a total of 259 occupations. Young women comprised 95 per cent of trainee textile and 99 per cent of trainee garment workers in 1989. And close to 100 per cent of trainee secretaries and salespersons were women. Very similar patterns operated in Hungary, where in vocational schools in 1990-91, only 0.7 per cent of apprentices in metallurgy and 1.1 per cent in engineering were women, but 98 per cent of apprentices in the textile and garment industries were women.²²

Pre-transition Patterns of Employment

Female employment under state socialism was marked by paradox. On the one hand, women did succeed in entering several traditionally male-dominated occupations, professions and sectors of the economy. On the other, there was marked and continuing occupational segregation of a kind not dissimilar from that obtaining in Western Europe. Contradictions were not confined to the situation of women within the labour force. Rather it was the complicated inter-relationship between their productive and their reproductive roles which was problematic. The attempt to regulate this relationship through gender-based prohibitions has been criticized by the authors of a 1992 World Bank report as both inefficient, in that such regulations may distort the functioning of the labour market, and discriminatory. In cases where women are banned from night-shifts or overtime work, this reduces their flexibility in seeking new employment in the transition period. It is also unclear why any such protective measures should not apply equally to men and women.²³

In the past, socialist realist stereotypes of a woman tractor driver or women wearing hard hats on a building site did mirror real changes. In comparison with Western Europe, women were well represented in the heavy industry, construction and mining sectors of the economy. But most women employed here worked in the over-staffed clerical and low-level administrative areas. And in absolute terms, the level of female representation was low in heavy as opposed to light industry, such as chemicals, clothing, food processing and textiles. And the retail and service sectors were heavily female-dominated. The disproportion in centrally planned economies between the industrial and service sectors might have been assumed to protect women's employment relative to

men's in the current transition period. In fact whilst heavy industry and mining are indeed amongst the hardest hit by collapse due to pollution or old technology, the top-heavy clerical and administrative structures in these industries make for a surprisingly high level of female redundancies in, for example, the Polish coal mining industry.²⁴

Women were therefore concentrated in lower status, low-paid jobs within lower status, low-paid sectors of the economy. Although they constituted a high proportion of workers in industry overall, they remained clustered in female-dominated light industrial production and in the clerical and administrative branches of both light and heavy industry. Hungarian economist Mária Ladó cites more than 90 per cent female domination of occupations such as typists, accountants, pay-roll clerks, financial clerks, cashiers and ticket-office clerks. In the mid-1980s in Hungary, women accounted for over half of all office workers in central public administration, and two thirds in local councils.²⁵

Heavy industry was prioritized by state socialism, but women's participation as production workers in heavy industry was low, thus privileging the male blue-collar worker. Júlia Szalai points out as 'one of the ironies of the socialist economy ... [the fact] that better-educated white-collar women tend to have relatively lower incomes than blue-collar men'.²⁶

Therefore, despite some of the earliest equal pay legislation, the state socialist economies were characterized by a gender gap in incomes which was not dissimilar to that in Western Europe. Women earned on average 66–75 per cent of men's salary, across all branches of economic activity.²⁷ Skilled workers in heavy industry and mining comprised the elite of these economies in terms of earning power. The concentration of women in clerical or low-grade administrative occupations meant that even women employed in the prioritized sectors of the economy earned a fraction of the wages commanded by male workers.

Female production workers in industry or in construction in the former GDR took home an average 12 per cent lower pay than their male counterparts. Nevertheless, the wage gap was not as wide as in the Federal Republic, where women earned on average 65–70 per cent of male incomes as compared with 76–84 per cent on average in the former GDR. In Poland, studies conducted in the early 1980s established that in all occupational categories barring the professions, gender was a far more decisive factor in wage differentials than level of education, occupational position, age, job tenure, or membership of the Communist Party. Amongst industrial workers in Poland in 1989, women earned only 70 per cent of men's wages. Yet the wage gap

is equally marked in the feminized professions. Hence in May 1990, while female lawyers earned 98 per cent as much as male lawyers, female doctors and social workers brought home only 72 per cent, women in administration and management earned 68 per cent, and women bookkeepers scraped together a mere 66.3 per cent of men's pay.²⁸

In Hungary, startling figures show that three quarters of women actually earned less than the national average wage, compared with only one third of men. And although the number of female workers who remained unskilled by 1980 was only marginally higher than the number of male unskilled workers, the gender gap among semi-skilled and especially skilled workers was still very marked. Around 59 per cent of women workers were engaged in manual work; half of those were semi-skilled and another quarter were unskilled.²⁹

In part these gender imbalances were attributable to discriminatory hiring practices reflecting a view of women as 'unreliable' labour because of their high level absenteeism on maternity and sick leave to care for children. Female choice also contributed, with maternal responsibilities leading women to choose jobs which were convenient but less demanding. Such jobs tended not to exploit fully their education and training, and were therefore also badly paid. Despite a degree of positive discrimination such as privileged access to childcare facilities and longer annual leave, single mothers were more likely than other women to choose less demanding jobs. Alena Kroupová has calculated that over 30 per cent of all Czechoslovak women workers were employed in jobs which under-utilized their skills and qualifications.³⁰

Those industrial branches with a high level concentration of female production workers were also lower-status and hence less well-paid. In light industry, these include electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, optics, lighting, textiles, clothing and the food industry. Weavers, spinners, tailors and other manual workers in the textile and garment trades in Hungary were four-fifths female.³¹ The poor earning capacity of women in light industry and textiles notwithstanding, these sectors will still be hard hit in competition on the world market. In their World Bank report, Monica Fong and Gillian Paul distinguish between the real and perceived cost of female labour.³²

Nevertheless, the social provisions available to women under state socialism did make them relatively expensive to employ. In future the decisive factors will be purely market-driven, and women stand to lose their jobs or social provisions, or both.

Female domination of the caring professions and the retail and

service sectors, in jobs involving catering, cleaning, serving, was extremely marked. Qualitatively speaking, it could be said that in the centrally planned economies of state socialism, in a manner different only in degree from that typical of Western market economies, a gendered division of labour made women perform, in their paid work, jobs which can be seen as an extension of their unpaid domestic roles, namely feeding, caring for, serving, or cleaning up after, men and children.

Women were under-represented towards the top of career hierarchies even in female-dominated professions. Pre-school facilities were exclusively staffed by women in the former GDR, but although in 1985 77 per cent of all teachers were women, only 32 per cent of head teachers were female. Women accounted for almost half of all employees in higher education in the former GDR, yet scarcely 3 per cent of those were in top positions, such as full professors, departmental heads or institute directors. Bialecki and Heyns have shown that although women in Poland accounted for 81 per cent of the workforce in education and science, they comprised only 13 per cent of full professors in 1987–88, and there was only one female university rector. The situation was similar in Hungary. In 1984, 80 per cent of primary school teachers, 50 per cent of secondary level teachers and 33 per cent of university teaching staff were women. In a 1976 survey conducted by the then Karl Marx University of Economics (now the Budapest University of Economics), although more than 50 per cent of instructors and 33 per cent of assistant professors were women, only 20 per cent of associate professors and 4 per cent of full professors were women.³³

Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that women *did* make inroads into formerly male-dominated professions. This was especially true in medicine and law.³⁴ But as they became feminized, these professions tended to become devalued in terms of both status and remuneration. Mária Ladó identifies a vicious circle whereby those sectors which employed large numbers of women offered less favourable wages, and vice versa. She maintains that 'the feminization of a career starts when, following technical, economic and social changes, the status and prestige of a given career begins to fall. Thus cause and effect are interwoven in a self-maintaining and self-reproducing mechanism'. As a consequence of feminization in the 1980s, around 80 per cent of all Hungarian women workers were in occupations in which female workers constituted the majority. Even within feminized professions, the apex of career hierarchies was dominated by men. In medicine, the senior hospital consultants tended to be men, whilst in

1989 in the former GDR, 95.5 per cent of trainee nurses were women. In Bulgaria in 1989, 90 per cent of paramedical personnel but only 35 per cent of doctors and dentists were women. Within specializations, there was a stereotypical gender divide: surgery, neurology, and psychiatry were 80 per cent male, whilst gynaecology and paediatrics were female-dominated.³⁵

On the other hand, it was not unusual for a woman to be the chief engineer or architect on a male-dominated building site. Brigitte Reimann's novel *Franziska Linkerhand*³⁶ about the construction of a new housing estate in the former GDR is one of several to fictionalize such cases. A socialist realist stereotype from this scenario is that of the female crane driver. One might be forgiven for feeling that this job involves the kind of manual dexterity, albeit at considerable spatial remove, for which women have always been noted. At the end of the day, it seems that what was achieved under state socialism was 'a high degree of female representation in the professions alongside continuing gender segregation of the rest of the labour force'.³⁷

Even within female-dominated sectors of the economy such as light industry or textiles, the managers still tended to be male.³⁸ The under-representation of women at the top of career hierarchies is illustrated by data on management. In 1989, only 14 per cent of the total female labour force in Czechoslovakia held management positions. Of those, 65 per cent were in lower-level, 25 per cent in mid-level and only 10 per cent in top management. The proportion of women holding top management positions in Poland in 1988 was even lower at 4.5 per cent. In Hungary in 1980, only 12 per cent of managers of enterprises or directors of institutes were women. Even more telling perhaps because of women's traditionally strong involvement in agricultural labour, only 5.6 per cent of directors of agricultural cooperatives were women in the same year. By 1991, only 5 per cent of large Hungarian companies were headed by women.³⁹

In the former GDR, a breakdown of women's share of leading positions by industrial sector shows that although the level of women managers in female-dominated sectors like light industry and trade was quite high, the figures were not commensurate with the high overall female share of employment in those sectors. Hence in light industry, women formed 56 per cent of the labour force, but accounted for only 44 per cent of leading positions, and in retail and trade 72 per cent of the workforce, but only 62 per cent of leading positions. In industry overall, they formed 41 per cent of the workforce, but only 21 per cent of those in management, and less than 5 per cent of those in top management.⁴⁰

What explains the diminishing presence of women towards the top of career hierarchies? *Frauenreport 90*, the first ever statistical report on women in the former GDR, compiled by Dr Marina Beyer, Secretary of State for Women's Affairs in the 1989-90 GDR transitional government, evaluates state socialism's record as contradictory. The report cites as positive the legislative and educational equality enjoyed by women. Against that, it lists gender inequalities within the family, lack of equality of career opportunity, and continuing prejudices against women as managers.⁴¹

Further, it could be argued that even prior to 1989, some of the affirmative action measures promulgated in favour of women in fact mitigated against their being promoted to managerial posts. Chapter 1 documented the state socialist system of paid leave to look after sick children which, even in those countries where it was available to either parent, was usually taken by women. According to working-class women interviewed in the former GDR in 1988, it was they who took this leave in around four fifths of cases.⁴² The fact of their frequent absenteeism led to their being defined by employers as 'unreliable' workers, which in turn mitigated against their promotion to positions of responsibility, thus reinforcing patterns of occupational segregation.

A further explanation for the under-representation of women at the top of career hierarchies can be found in women's own reluctance to take on responsible positions at work. This tendency was reflected in a survey conducted for the ILO in the Russian city of Naberejnye Chelny. The results revealed pronounced reluctance on the part of both men and women to take on management roles, but a substantial gender gap in responses. Only 8 per cent of men and 3 per cent of women in the sample aspired to become managers. Even against a background of work degradation and devaluation of individual initiative, men still showed greater willingness to take on positions of responsibility, though 68 per cent of men and 72 per cent of women interviewed stated baldly that they would not dream of becoming managers.⁴³

Women in Poland displayed far less willingness than men to accept promotion. And in Czechoslovakia, a 1989 study carried out in the Škoda heavy engineering factory in Plzeň showed similar results. Of the plant's total workforce of 34,000, women numbered 35 per cent: 42 per cent of whom were on the shop floor, and 58 per cent in administration. Asked whether they would wish to work in management, 49.8 per cent said no; only 3.3 per cent expressed positive interest in the prospect.⁴⁴

Further reasons for the invisibility of women in top positions were state enterprise managers' reluctance to promote women in view of the

extended maternity leave and paid sick leave provisions already mentioned, and the differential retirement age. Women in most state socialist countries were entitled to retire at fifty-five (sixty in Poland), men five years later. Structural as well as socio-cultural reasons thus contributed to the vicious circle whereby women themselves were less likely to take on management positions, for which male managers anyway tended not to consider them suitable.

Although women's employment was central to the state socialist project, it is unclear in retrospect whether this followed a real commitment to the 'emancipation' of women, or merely an economy-led demand. Further, motivation aside, the record on equality of opportunity is highly contradictory. On the one hand, legislation, educational access and positive discriminatory measures mobilized women and supported them in improving their qualifications and skill levels. On the other, the structure of the labour force featured marked occupational segregation and wage differentials. Will the female labour force fare better in a market economy? An analysis of the present transition period will illuminate some of the opportunities and the costs of marketization for women.

The Transition to the Market: Gender-Specific Implications

The transition from centrally planned to market economies in East Central Europe represents a moment of opportunity, but also of high costs, at least in the short term. Spiralling inflation is compounded by high unemployment, and a decline in real wages. The highest price rises have been registered in those basic necessities which were previously subsidized, such as rent, foodstuffs, public transport, childcare, and children's clothes. Taken together, these factors make the management of household budgets extremely problematic.

Real wages declined by 28 per cent in Poland and 15-20 per cent in Hungary during 1990, and by a further 10 per cent in Hungary during 1991-92.⁴⁵ Food prices in Hungary went up by an average 35 per cent in 1990, with meat and milk up 40 per cent, and butter up 50 per cent. In Bulgaria, prices jumped 1,200 per cent when they were freed in February 1991, with wages remaining static. Prices rose 600-700 per cent in Poland during 1990. A Polish government survey as early as January 1990 showed that families were spending 60-65 per cent of household budgets on food, and another 20 per cent on regular bills, leaving only 15-20 per cent for other expenditure. This trend

inevitably meant a marked decline in consumer demand with a knock-on effect which magnified the problems of, for example, the textile and shoe industries. In Hungary too, the drop in domestic demand as a result of falling real incomes and reduced consumption was noted in 1992.⁴⁶

The removal of subsidies on childcare facilities meant that already in spring 1990, many women in Poland were reputedly having to give up their jobs because they could not afford the cost of childcare. Women's average salary at that time was 400,000 złoty per month, of which rent, phone, electricity etc. took 25 per cent, and the basic food bill the rest. Yet at the same time, kindergarten charges were 60–80,000 per month per child. There were reports of lone mothers sending their children to board with someone in the countryside in order to be able to continue going to work so as to maintain themselves and their children. Izabela Nowacka, President of the Polish Women's League, reported in June 1991 that 50 per cent of kindergartens in Łódź had already been closed down because the sharp price rise had led so many mothers to remove their children. The loss of childcare facilities compounded the already acute female unemployment in Łódź, resulting from the closure of the textile industry which had dominated the city.

In East Germany too, the textile industry is collapsing. Women comprised 75 per cent of the textile workers in the past. The Saxon Cotton and Thread Spinning Works, for example, used to employ 13,000 workers. In 1992, while production was being wound down, the workforce had shrunk to 1,300 and was set to fall to a mere 300. Its products used to be exported to over thirty countries.⁴⁷

Understandably, these abrupt and acute changes have brought general despondency in their wake. A survey of 6,000 families conducted by the Institute of Economic and Social Studies of the Hungarian Trade Unions in December 1990 established that 48.8 per cent of them felt their financial situation had substantially worsened. A June 1992 EMNID poll for *Der Spiegel* in Germany reported that 70 per cent of East Germans thought the economic situation was either bad or very bad. Monika Lopez, a 35-year-old married mother of four in the new Federal states, expressed a widespread sense of hopelessness:

It's shit now. My husband commutes, working in West Germany. I was one of the first to lose my job in November 1990. ... It's better for your kids, they said. You can fetch coal to heat for them in the mornings and make school lunches in peace. How hypocritical can you get! With four children, every employer will think: No thanks. Now I do any kind of shit job: cleaning, scrubbing, painting windows, mending fences, shovelling

rubble. The main thing is not to become a case for social security. If that happens, I'll turn on the gas and kill all of us.⁴⁸

In summer 1992, a survey of attitudes conducted by Mintel International in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the European part of Russia showed that more than three out of four Poles thought things were 'a lot better' under state socialism, and that well over half of respondents in every former state socialist country said there were too many changes. The survey documented a fall in GDP and a widening gap between rich and poor throughout these countries. It concluded that Portugal, poorest country in the EC, was nevertheless richer than Poland, Romania and European Russia, and raised doubts about the survival of optimism in the face of a continuing decline in economic conditions.⁴⁹

Unemployment, Retraining, Re-employment Opportunities

The struggle to survive in the market, accompanied by the pressures of the privatization process, creates an inexorable logic for the need to shed labour. The unproductive over-employment of the state socialist period has been well documented. So too the archaic technological base and poor infrastructure operating in those economies have been much cited as barriers to foreign investment. Privatization, marketization more generally, and the introduction of new technology therefore combine to force high levels of redundancies and unemployment.

In this process, it seems that women are the first to go. It is striking that in all of the former state socialist countries of East Central Europe bar Hungary, they currently form the majority of the unemployed, constituting 50–70 per cent of the current total. As of mid-1992, women were estimated to make up 70 per cent of the unemployed (80 per cent in Moscow) in post-Soviet Russia. In Brandenburg, one in five women were out of work, and in the new Federal German states overall, women accounted for 67 per cent of the total number unemployed in early 1992. In Poland in April 1991, women accounted for 52 per cent of the unemployed, and in Bulgaria in the same month, for 62 per cent. At the end of March 1992, 52 per cent of the total unemployed in Czechoslovakia and 56 per cent in the Czech lands were women.⁵⁰

Why is it that women constitute the majority of the unemployed in all of these countries except Hungary? For at least two generations of women, it was the 'norm' to be employed in the labour force. Women could scarcely be construed as a 'reserve army of labour', but rather

constituted a permanent and very substantial section of the workforce. In this situation it is not immediately evident why, faced with the need to shed labour, women should be the first to be dismissed.

What does become obvious on closer examination is that the very rights that women did enjoy under state socialism, and the policies of positive discrimination which underwrote those rights, are now operating against their interests as employees. So, for example, women are dismissed as 'unreliable workers', precisely because of the extended childcare leave and the paid leave to look after sick children which they still enjoy.

Legislation which is still legally valid, such as maternity leave, is currently being disregarded by enterprises struggling to survive in the new market conditions. In Russia, this legislation is in practice being 'violated all the time', maintains Anastasia Posadskaya, Director of the Institute for Gender Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, 'because either the job doesn't exist any more, or the enterprise has been privatized and the new owners feel no responsibility to take the women back'.⁵¹

There are many instances of massive regional concentrations of female unemployment. One reason for this is the dismantling of the enormously top-heavy central and local government bureaucracies of state socialism, in which most of the lower-level technical, clerical and administrative staff were women. Another is the massive level of university department and research institute closures within the formerly enormous scientific and research sectors of state socialism. These closures are partly accounted for by the discrediting of entire subject fields such as philosophy, Marxism-Leninism, and often history and economics, but partly by lack of government finance. As in the state administrative sector, a high proportion of lower-level researchers and university teachers, and almost all administrative and clerical staff in these institutions, were women. Recent Hungarian unemployment data echoes the predominance of women in administration. A breakdown according to professional groups in May 1992 shows women as constituting 41 per cent of the total number registered unemployed, but within that, a high 66.5 per cent and 88.9 per cent of two levels of administrators, and 63.4 per cent of the total non-manual workers.⁵²

A further cause of high female unemployment is to be found in the collapse of the textile and clothing industries which were very important in the state socialist period but with very few exceptions cannot compete in the world market on the basis of quality or price against imports, particularly from the developing countries and the DAEs

(Dynamic Asian Economies). This is the outcome in the first instance of the loss of bilateral trading agreements with the former Soviet Union and the transfer to hard currency trade under newly liberalized foreign trade régimes.

In Slovakia, however, the textile industry seems to be surviving with export markets to Italy assured. In Martin in Slovakia, plans are underway to establish an entirely new, high-tech textile enterprise in a project to convert and diversify the town's heavily concentrated arms industry. In Trenčín, which had 5,000 registered unemployed at the time, of whom 102 were qualified machinists, a clothing factory advertised in March 1992 for machinists. None of the local qualified workers applied, due to the fact that the wages were not sufficiently differentiated from unemployment benefits. As a result, the jobs were offered to workers from neighbouring Ukraine, for whom apparently a low Slovak salary would appear high.

These kinds of pay and living standard differentials between the former state socialist countries will have enormous repercussions in terms of the movement of labour between countries, with ramifications for issues of nationality, social welfare and citizenship. It is not unlikely that a new breed of 'guest workers' will be born, including the Russians who drive to Poland to set up stalls in the world's largest street market underneath the former Palace of Culture in Warsaw. By spring 1991, there were already 20,000 East Germans a month seeking work in the Western part of the country,⁵³ and there were reports of many more who commute weekly to the West. This emerging trend could create major gender-skewed demographic distortions, with fit and skilled men becoming weekly commuters westwards or longer term 'guest workers' while women remain behind to care for the elderly and the young in the industrial and environmental wastelands of the former state socialist countries.⁵⁴

One of the disturbing phenomena of the present transition period is the lack of forward planning, particularly in relation to the specific employment needs of women. There is no consciousness on the part of politicians that regional concentrations of high female unemployment, for example, or the widespread closure of childcare facilities, could have gender-specific implications for which one should plan in terms of retraining opportunities. Part of the problem here is that state intervention and the notion of planning are themselves in disrepute as a legacy of the over-planned and -centralized economic management of state socialism. Retraining is haphazard and non-focused, and in most of these countries seems to consist, as far as women are concerned,

almost exclusively and universally of computer training courses. This may represent a skilling process for secretarial, clerical or administrative workers, but for highly skilled female industrial workers, fully qualified women engineers, or researchers, it must mean a level of de-skilling.

In the future, it is possible that the introduction of new technology, or the much-needed expansion of the retail and service sectors may create new opportunities which will favour women's employment. In their World Bank discussion paper, Monica Fong and Gillian Paul suggest this, noting that 'many women – because of experience and education – have acquired strong positions in potentially expanding sectors, such as consumer goods and service industries, particularly financial services, commerce and trade, and information technology. They have also developed entrepreneurial skills that could prove advantageous in the private sector'.⁵⁵

However, at least one set of professions which were feminized and of course relatively unimportant in state socialism's command economy may well become 'masculinized' under market conditions. It is in the banking, finance and insurance sector perhaps more than any other that marketization has produced an enormous growth in size and prestige. It will be interesting to monitor whether the market-induced enhancement in the prestige of accountants, bank and insurance clerks will lead to increased salary levels and the consequent displacement of women by men. Fong and Paul point out that policymakers' neglect 'during transition of the particular employment needs and requirements of women ... would have negative consequences, not only for parity between men and women, but also for reform'. This important insight, namely that to neglect the gender implications is shortsighted and ultimately inefficient in terms of the success of the economic reform process itself, leads Fong and Paul to recommend a series of 'pro-active measures', including retraining programmes for women and the provision of childcare facilities.

In the shorter term, however, the process of marketization is marked by the closure of old industries rather than investment in new branches, by the closure of childcare facilities and a dearth of retraining programmes specifically geared to women's needs, so that women are particularly badly affected. There is also evidence to suggest that the introduction of new technology itself, even prior to the current rapid and fundamental economic reform, was linked with the displacement of women. Despite the fact that new production aids such as information technology, flexible automation, or robotization can mean a qualitative improvement in working conditions, which might suggest the creation of

a more woman-friendly working environment, women's share of these sectors in the former GDR showed a continuous decline during the 1980s, even taking into account the creation of female jobs in micro-electronic and chip production.⁵⁶

This would seem to suggest what might be deemed a reversal of gender stereotypes. As new technology makes jobs cleaner and more highly skilled, men opt to move into them, leaving women to perform the simple and repetitive tasks or the lower status jobs which do not offer career-enhancement opportunities. In *Frauenreport 90*, Dr Marina Beyer considers a set of different explanations for this phenomenon. First, the introduction of new technology often requires relevant or specialist training, for which women are less likely to volunteer because of their family responsibilities. The same constraint operates against women taking up such jobs, since for example robotization in the car industry often involves shift work. Finally, and even more gender-specifically, the report notes that jobs involving the most modern technologies often command higher wages, and are therefore more likely to be offered to men. This tendency for women to be pushed out of formerly female-dominated occupations by the introduction of new technology is confirmed by figures showing substantial decreases in the percentage of young women in the GDR beginning vocational training in data processing and electronics between 1980 and 1989.⁵⁷

Mária Ladó has registered a parallel tendency in Hungary. Margaret Sutherland notes that this trend operates in both Eastern and Western Europe. For example, in computers, software tends to be viewed as women's domain while hardware is male-ascribed, and salaries get adjusted accordingly. Sutherland cites a report of the Commission of the European Community showing a similar pattern of gender-based segregation operating in the field of information technology.⁵⁸

A number of Polish economists now accept large-scale unemployment as inevitable, according to the Darwinian notion that 'there will be winners and losers' in the transformation process. Professor Antoni Kukliński feels that the urgent need is for Polish society to develop a psychology of competitiveness, 'an élite that will be competitive on the European scene'. To this end, he proposed that what he deemed the stifling egalitarianism of socialist educational policy be rejected and that Warsaw University become a training school for the élite along the lines of the French '*hautes écoles*'. In economic terms, he claimed that 'the dilemma "equality versus efficiency" must be solved in favour of efficiency. ... In order to develop the mechanism of individual motivations we need an "optimum" amount of inequality'.⁵⁹

A significant impediment to women's re-employment prospects is that neither sex discrimination in employment opportunities, nor such issues as sexual harassment at work were on state socialism's agenda. The result is that now, advertisements for jobs are frequently blatantly gender-specific. 'Men only' advertisements are widespread. For example, in the Slovak Republic in February 1991 there were 7,563 vacancies, but only 29 per cent of them were for women. In Hungary in 1988 and 1989, between 65 per cent and 71 per cent of vacancies for manual jobs were men-only. Mária Ladó reported that the better the job offered, the more likely it is to specify men-only. Foreign joint ventures openly prefer men to women in their job advertisements and many companies specify men for their higher managerial positions. Women in Poland reported that the length of skirt to be worn to interview or the shape of legs favoured for the job has been included in some advertisements. The state-run employment agency initially had different departments for men and women, which inevitably meant gender-specific job vacancy advertisements.⁶⁰

Another problem is the requirement, often stated in job advertisements or by employment agencies, that a person seeking work be 'available' to take up a job at a moment's notice. Women with young children are less likely to be immediately available, and are thus disadvantaged from the outset. Getting a job is predicated on having one's children placed, yet finding a childcare place is often dependent on having a job.

In January 1990 there were three unemployed women, but just one unemployed man, for every job offer in Poland. By April 1991, there were 17 unemployed men for each vacancy for men, but 59 unemployed women for each vacancy for women. In December 1991, despite the fact that over 50 per cent of unemployed people in Poland were women, there were job offers for only 0.83 per cent of unemployed women. In this situation, Fong and Paul have calculated that the probability of obtaining new employment in East Central Europe is over three times greater for a man than for a woman.⁶¹

One of the positive job opportunities for women in East Central Europe is as an entrepreneur, owner of a small food or fashion retail outlet, private hairdresser, provider of a service. There is considerable interest in this area. In Brandenburg, one of the 'new' Federal German states, a women's organization named OWEN is setting up plans for a 'train the trainer' scheme. Unemployed female academics from the former GDR with the necessary languages would train women in Moscow and Warsaw in the essentials of setting up small businesses.

The latter would then disseminate this training more widely in their own country. A recent report on privatization in Bulgaria noted that one fifth of new entrepreneurs were women, but many of these, it was thought, were simply providing cover for their men as the real owners. This is regarded in more than one country as one of the ways in which members of the old *nomenklatura* are remasking their move sideways into new positions of – this time capitalist as opposed to state socialist – power. A public opinion poll carried out by the Bulgarian Centre for the Study of Democracy in October 1991 found that 42.7 per cent of women have neither the intention nor the desire to start a private business of any kind (compared with 35.8 per cent of men).⁶²

In Moscow, the Women's Association 'Mission' founded in 1990 by Dr Tatiana Lukianenko promotes training courses for women wanting to set up in business. By autumn 1992 it had created 189 jobs. Júlia Szalai has remarked on the utilization of women's 'former informal market experiences', namely in the Hungarian 'second' economy. Thus their participation rates in trading (65 per cent) and new small cooperatives (43 per cent) is high, and '32 per cent of the owners, managers, and members' of 'new privatized businesses' are women. This optimistic view counters the findings of a 1988 survey, which documented the relative unwillingness of women in Hungary to go into business. Whilst 36 per cent of men expressed the wish to become an entrepreneur, only 16 per cent of women echoed this.⁶³

Self-employment is much favoured by policy makers right across Europe, and in the case of former state socialist countries has the advantage of encouraging talents not rewarded in the past, namely enterprise, individual initiative, resourcefulness. However, it would be naïve to imagine that this could have a major impact on female unemployment in the current marketization process. Rather, it must remain a minority solution. The small-scale example of Artemis B.T. in Szeged in Hungary, a three-woman language-teaching, translation and interpretation agency, is more likely to be typical.⁶⁴

One successful example of female entrepreneurship appears to be the current boom in prostitution, which had always been a source of hard currency earnings in Berlin or Moscow. In a slightly bizarre illustration of the transition to the market, politicians from Rostock in East Germany paid a visit to legalized 'Eros Centres' in West Germany's Bielefeld and Düsseldorf. They wished to learn how to bring order into the chaos of Rostock, a port city where prostitution has burgeoned since unification, but without West German-style health checks and insurance policies for the women. Now there are plans to build a 'hostel'

along West German lines, to eliminate the disorderly caravans of the new female entrepreneurs.⁶⁵

Prostitution could be viewed as the *non plus ultra* of entrepreneurship, with women selling their body rather than – in alienated Marxist form – their labour power! Even before the notion of prostitution emerged as the expression of a specifically female form of business enterprise, it had sometimes been seen as a strike for self-determination in contrast to the reality of women's harsh working lives. In a first-person narrative documenting the involvement of women in heavy labour of the type officially banned by law, a woman from Petrozavodsk in Karelia (in the former Soviet Union), who works lifting heavy mail bags, says:

It should not be surprising that some women leave this 'women's work' for prostitution ... preferring even that humiliating 'profession' because it gives a woman at least some measure of freedom, some degree of choice. ... Of course prostitution is ruinous for women. I do not want to justify it. ... Yet, ironically, prostitution has become a euphemism for women's freedom, a freedom that society condemns.⁶⁶

Russian women report that a current joke amongst mothers of young daughters about their prospects in life postulates a choice between 'getting married, which is not very attractive, or becoming a prostitute, which is much more attractive'. 'Sex tourism' is one of Albania's main sources of income. Once hermetically sealed against the world, Albania has now become what the German feminist magazine *Emma* describes as the 'bargain-basement brothel of the West'. In a country where every second child suffers from malnutrition and where 80 per cent of the population is unemployed, the fact that the family is the ultimate value does not prevent mothers from selling their daughters to neighbouring Greece in exchange for food, coal or petrol.⁶⁷

It is understandable that the double burden of the past, and the difficulties of the present combine to make women favour staying at home or working part-time or from home. Indeed Solidarity has proposed introducing a 'family wage', by which men would collect substantial supplements to their salary for each child if their wives did not work, thus providing financial incentives for women to stay at home and simultaneously to raise the birthrate. Yet the budgetary constraints that have hindered implementation of the policy in Poland also operate in the other former state socialist countries. Moreover, the experience of the past and the inflationary pressures of the present suggest that one wage, however enhanced, is unlikely to be sufficient to keep a family. Even

single-headed households were and often are dependent on the parent holding two to three jobs to make ends meet in Hungary.

Long before *perestroika*, the central character in Natalya Baranskaya's *A Week Like Any Other* responded angrily to her husband's suggestion that she should give up her job and stay at home with the children, pointing out that 'there's no way we could live on your salary', and adding a defence of her job as crucial to her self-respect and fulfilment:

No, Nol 'Dima,' I say, 'You want me to do all the routine stuff, while you do your interesting work, because you think my work isn't worth it. You're just a rotten capitalist.'

'Maybe I am,' says Dima with an unfriendly smile, 'but it's not just a question of money. It would be better for the children as well. ...'

'Dima, do you really think I don't want what's best for the children? You know I do, but what you're suggesting would kill me. What about my five years at university, my degree, my seniority, my research? It's easy enough for you to dismiss it all, but if I didn't work, I'd go mad, I'd become impossible to live with.'⁶⁸

In addition, women in East Central Europe have little notion of part-time or home-based work, since these forms of employment were rare or did not exist under state socialism. Already there are signs in Czechoslovakia that in the process of privatization of small retail units for example, family members, especially women, tend to work long, unregulated hours for very small remuneration. The lack of protection in terms of low rates of pay or lack of holiday entitlement, sick pay and pension rights, standard features of much part-time work in the West, is unknown. Similarly, the exploitative conditions characteristic of casualization and home-based work will be new to East European women.

Western findings on the feminization of poverty seem already to be echoed in the transitional economies. This especially affects the high number of lone parents, of whom the vast majority are women. A report in the newsletter of the East German-based Independent Women's Association compares the social support and employment which enabled lone mothers to support themselves and their children in the past in the former GDR with lone mothers in the West who are dependent on social welfare and threatened with poverty. In the new Federal states, 20 per cent of all families with school-age children have only one parent, compared with what is already considered a high 13 per cent in the old Federal states. As of the end of July 1991, East German women were edging closer to poverty as a result of unemployment and

the closure of childcare facilities. Every tenth unemployed woman in the new Federal states was a lone parent and their bargaining position in terms of re-employment was clearly weak. When Ute Pust, a 27-year-old lone mother of two, wanted back her job in a hotel kitchen after her maternity leave, as was her right under earlier GDR law, her boss said simply: 'Either you work on the late shift, or not at all.' In Russia, although state support for single mothers more than doubled after price reforms began in January 1992, these increases were pitifully inadequate in the face of prices, which rose between ten- and thirty-fold between January and June 1992.⁶⁹

In Czechoslovakia, the term feminization of poverty is also currently in use to describe 'the negative effects that the economic reforms have had on women'. Young women especially are disadvantaged in Poland and East Germany. It is particularly difficult for young female graduates and school-leavers to get jobs, apprenticeship placements, or further training.⁷⁰

Another group especially prone to poverty are older women. The allegedly positive discrimination in favour of women in the form of their five years earlier retirement age in effect operated against their interests even under state socialism, but even more so in the current situation of surplus labour. Now, one of the largest groups of unemployed people are women around the age of fifty, in the so-called pre-retirement bracket, whose chances of finding new employment are almost zero. An example is Heide Haack, who worked for fifteen years as a shepherdess on a collective farm in the GDR, and then took on her own herd of 550 sheep together with her husband. In the past, she was publicly lauded, and given medals and bonuses. Sheep-breeding was the money-spinner of the farm. In November 1991, the sheep were slaughtered. Now she is suddenly 'ancient', aged forty-nine. The job centre has told her she won't ever find another job, and she's 'too old' for it to be worthwhile sending her on a retraining course.⁷¹

Women, who form the majority of the older age group, are also more prone to poverty because they live longer on smaller pensions, due to the wage differentials which operated during their working lives. Thus in Czechoslovakia, the 'relation between men and women in the post-productive group is 34 per cent men and 66 per cent women, with seven times more women than men in the over-80 age group'. A greater number of women are dependent on the pension as their sole source of income, because of their earlier retirement age and because a lower number of female pensioners work after retirement. Wage differentials during their earning life coupled with their earlier retirement age mean

that 'women have on average 5.6 per cent smaller pensions than men under the same conditions.' Retirement pensions in 1985 were 53 per cent of average net wage, whereas the officially defined socially acceptable minimum income was 56 per cent of average per capita income. In 1982 in Czechoslovakia, 15.3 per cent of all pensioners were on the so-called socially acceptable minimum pension; of these, 89 per cent were women. Recipients of this minimum pension spent four fifths of their income on basic needs (food, housing, heat). Czech sociologist Jiřina Šiklová has characterized this as the failure of the supposed strength of socialism, namely in social welfare policy.⁷²

Since unification many women of retirement age in the former GDR have been discriminated against: 'In an unprecedented move, the Bonn government has reduced and capped the pensions of doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, college professors, and public administrators, along with other public employees in the former GDR. . . . Women, who were concentrated in public administration, education, medicine, and the judiciary, are especially affected.'⁷³

Under state socialism, women's labour force participation was taken for granted as the norm, yet it was marred by a high degree of occupational segregation and a gender gap in pay levels. The double or triple burden exacerbated these contradictions so that many women experienced their working lives as an obligation to be endured rather than a right they enjoyed.

The 'norm' which appears to be emerging during the current transition to the market is precisely the opposite side of the coin. Full-time motherhood is being posited as women's destiny and sacred duty, almost as though the life experience of two generations of working women was a mirage, or had not existed at all. Moreover, this new ideology is also fraught with paradox and pitfalls. Both models tend to instrumentalize women in the name of the collective.

Will the future bring a synthesis of the two models, or at least a compromise between the two imperatives, that women 'ought' to be workers as well as mothers, or alternatively 'ought' to sacrifice their working lives to family responsibilities? Is there a middle way between the duty to be a worker, and the right to be unemployed, sanctified in motherhood? And where in these 'oughts' is the autonomous choice of women themselves?

It is as yet unclear what the future patterns and levels of female employment will be. Whether economic restructuring could ultimately favour women's employment opportunities remains to be seen. And only time will tell whether women, at this point in time apparently

content to shed the double burden for 'a few years at home with the children', might not in the medium term mobilize in support of the right to work. Even now, there is some evidence to suggest that women did not work solely for reasons of economic necessity, but for the social solidarity with other women it gave them, and the sense of pride in their work. Indeed there are many voices which suggest that women's self-esteem and even their sense of self was integrally bound up with their working lives. Surveys in several countries have indicated that, even if their husband did earn enough to keep the family, most women would still want to go out to work.

While inconclusive, then, the evidence seems to point in the direction of women themselves, given the choice, preferring the contradiction-laden option of participation in the public sphere to that of self-fulfilment confined to the private sphere. The following voices and survey results give credence to such an interpretation of likely future aspirations. What is also clear, as stated at the outset of this chapter, is that women's attitudes to defending the right to work will inevitably be influenced by the nature of the work they performed under state socialism, and the career opportunities they had.

In interviews, many women in the former GDR and Czechoslovakia say that work and a rewarding job is part of their sense of identity, or in the case of Russia, their only real aspiration apart from having a child. In contrast, some young women in Poland and Hungary feel unable to see their mothers as role models, old before their time, worn out with work but without much career status to show for it. And the high take-up statistics for extended childcare leave in Hungary documented in Chapter 2 suggest there is a definite backlash on the part of young mothers against putting their children into nurseries before the age of three. As the generation who themselves spent their childhood in state childcare facilities, they have no wish to subject their children to impersonal nurseries with overlarge classes, excessive resultant regimentation, proneness to infection, and general lack of individual attention.

On the other hand women 'choosing' or welcoming unemployment as an opportunity to spend a few years with the children have no past experience which would suggest to them that such a choice may well mean long-term unemployment. In the state socialist past, these extended childcare leave measures were associated with the right to have one's job held open.

Studies on the former GDR and Russia suggest that women for whom working outside the home was the norm would not voluntarily

choose the option of domesticity. In Hungary too, Júlia Szalai cites women's 'desire for a more flexible combination of employment, (*which most women definitely want to maintain* – [my italics])' with domestic duties. An INFAS poll in autumn 1990 in East Germany threw up only 3 per cent (of 1,423 women between the ages of 16 and 60) who described being a housewife as their ideal, as against 65 per cent who said that even if they didn't need the income, they would still choose to go to work. An earlier Polish study had shown that between 68–92 per cent of women (depending on socio-occupational category) 'would continue working, even if they were not under financial pressure to do so'.⁷⁴ And that study was conducted at a time when jobs were not yet under threat.

Further studies suggest that women did derive a sense of identity and worth from their working lives, in addition to the relative economic independence which their jobs brought them. Dr Regine Hildebrandt, Social Democrat Minister for Women, Labour and Health in the East German state of Brandenburg, points out that women contributed 30–40 per cent of family income in the past, compared with 18 per cent in West Germany. 'We did not have equality in the way they made us believe, but self-awareness was forged by participation in the work process.' Despite the lack of real gender equality in the former GDR, at least 'women were economically independent', says Hildebrandt, voted German Woman of the Year in 1991.⁷⁵ This claim may have been relatively more true for women in East Germany than in other state socialist countries.

Hana Navarová, for example, speaks of women's labour force participation in Czechoslovakia producing 'a proclaimed rather than real economic independence from men'. Navarová also introduces the interesting idea that there was a dialectical process whereby women were not only hindered in their career development by their responsibilities as workers and mothers, but that their maternal roles were equally modified by the 'norm' of labour force participation, such that they went to work, not only for reasons of economic necessity or job satisfaction, but also because they perceived it as their 'family duty'. This 'duty' appears to have had positive spin-offs, Navarová asserts, for 'women obtain status, experience, skills in their jobs, they find financial independence, many of them fulfil themselves in and identify with their work'. The evidence on job satisfaction, like the reality of women's working lives under state socialism, is contradictory: Alena Kroupová maintains that 'a professional career does not rank supreme in the scale of values of Czechoslovak women. ... Very often, mothers do not

conceive employment as a means of self-realization, but rather as an economic necessity to ensure the family's adequate standard of living.⁷⁶

However, even where women performed ostensibly dreary or repetitive jobs on the production line, there is some evidence that the social contact and solidarity with other women at work, plus a certain pride in their product, may have contributed to women's sense of self being constructed around their working lives. In a 1991 television documentary on the Narva light bulb factory in East Berlin, the woman worker and single mother on whom the film focused not only prided herself on being able to fend for herself and her three small children, but also said that when she walked through Berlin at night she felt a personal sense of pride and achievement at seeing 'her' lights in the city at night.

It is therefore by no means clear yet whether women will continue to collude with their retrenchment from the workforce and assigned responsibility for the private sphere, or whether they may yet fight to defend or regain the right to work. 'In view of the social norm of "the employed woman" which has existed for a few generations,' concludes Navarová, 'their return to the household is unrealistic, or realistic only for a certain period of time.'

For women to defend the right to work as one of the equal citizenship rights guaranteed them at least in principle by the new democracies, the role of formal and informal political involvement on their own behalf will be central. The next two chapters analyse the mismatch between formal democratic rights and women's voices being heard; and the potential of, and the difficulties facing, new grassroots groups.

Notes

1. Lolita Alimova, b. 1956 in Samarkand, quoted in *Der Spiegel*, no. 21, 1992.
2. Dr Dieter Angst, a West German working as State Secretary for Planning and the Environment in Saxony in the eastern part of Germany, was quoted by Quentin Peel, in: 'Symbols of Hope and Hardship', *Financial Times*, 11.8.92.
3. Angela Merkel, the East German Federal Minister for Women, reflected a similar view when she said, in retrospect, that the GDR had lulled women into an 'illusory life situation'. She justified the hardships of the transition which, as Dr Angst had maintained, fall mainly on women, by asserting that the level of state welfare provided by the GDR 'could not be guaranteed in any society governed by competition' [my translation, BE]. Merkel was quoted in *Der Spiegel*, no. 24, 1992, p. 101.
4. Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, 'Women in Poland: Choices to be Made', in: *Shifting Territories: Feminism in Europe*, special issue no. 39 of *Feminist Review*, winter 1991, pp. 182–87.
5. Francine Du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women Walking the Tightrope*, Virago, London, 1991, p. 37.
6. On the hypothetical notion of the 'family wage' (in the former Soviet Union), Maxine

Molyneux, 'The "Woman Question" in the Age of Perestroika', in: *New Left Review*, no. 183, 1990, p. 36; (on Hungary) Ruth Rosen, 'Women and Democracy in Czechoslovakia', in: *Peace and Democracy News*, fall 1990; Chris Corrin, 'Magyar Women's Lives: Complexities and Contradictions', in: Corrin, ed., *Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Scarlet Press, London, 1992, p. 34.

7. For comparative details on levels of labour force participation between countries and over time, including the East-West comparison, see Table A4 in the Appendix. The GDR figure of 91.3% includes 8% of women involved in vocational training. The dramatic increase in female labour force participation during the state socialist period can be illustrated by the Czechoslovak case, where in 1947, women represented 35% of the labour force, and only 27% of the non-agricultural labour force, compared with 47% of the total workforce in 1991 (Source: Liba Paukert, 'The Changing Economic Status of Women in the Period of Transition to a Market Economy System: The Case of Czechoslovakia after 1989', in: Valentine Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies*, OUP Clarendon Series, Oxford, 1993).

8. In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 95% of new labour contracts formed since 1970 have been for part-time positions filled by women. In 1986, 90.3% of all part-time workers were women. By contrast, in 1986 only 3% of Hungarian, 6% of Polish and 7.6% of Czech and Slovak women workers were part-timers (Sources: for the FRG, Dorothy Rosenberg, 'The New Home Economics: Women, Work and Family in the United Germany', ms., 1992; for Hungary, Mária Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy: The Case of Hungary', in: *The Impact of Economic and Political Reform on the Status of Women in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, Proceedings of United Nations Regional Seminar, Vienna, 8–12 April 1991, ST-CSDHA-19-UN, New York, 1992; for Poland and Czechoslovakia, Alena Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings in Central and East European Countries', Paper prepared for Tripartite Symposium on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment for Men and Women in Employment in Industrialized Countries, Prague, May 1990).

9. The number of female workers working part-time in Czechoslovakia increased from 7.6% in 1986 to 11.6% in 1989. The proportion of women workers expressing a preference for part-time work increased from 19% in 1986 to 23–27% by 1989. Of the roughly 400,000 women who return to their jobs annually after maternity leave in Czechoslovakia, 40% of women would like to work part-time (Source: Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earning', 1990).

10. Natalya Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other* (1969), translated by Pieta Monks, Virago, London, 1989. For an extract illustrating these difficulties and the resulting stress levels of women, see Chapter 2 above.

11. See Table A2 in the Appendix. The information conveyed in this paragraph is based on a graph in *The World's Women 1970–1990*, UN document cited in the *1992 World Labour Report 5*, ILO, Geneva, 1992, Chart 1.3, p. 25.

12. The share of women in post-secondary education is detailed by Ireneusz Bialecki and Barbara Heyns, 'Educational Attainment, The Status of Women, and the Private School Movement in Poland', in: Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies*, 1993.

13. Júlia Szalai, 'Some Aspects of the Changing Situation of Women in Hungary', in: *Signs*, vol. 17, no. 1, autumn 1991, p. 153.

14. Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy', 1992.

15. Bialecki and Heyns, 'Educational Attainment, the Status of Women', 1993.

16. See Table A5.2 in the Appendix for detailed figures. Yet it must be noted that the numbers of women studying technical sciences remained low.

17. Dorothy Rosenberg, 'Shock Therapy: GDR Women in Transition from a Socialist Welfare State to a Social Market Economy', in: *Signs*, vol. 17, no. 1, autumn 1991, p. 13, based on Gunnar Winkler, ed., *Sozialreport 90*, Verlag Die Wirtschaft, Berlin, pp. 41–44.

18. Bialecki and Heyns, 'Educational Attainment, the Status of Women', 1993. See also Renata Siemieńska, 'Poland' in: Gail P. Kelly, ed., *International Handbook of Women's Education*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1989, pp. 323-47. Data from December 1990 on unemployed school leavers in Poland illustrates the knock-on effect of this educational gender imbalance in type of secondary school: 82% of unemployed school leavers from general secondary schools were girls, as were 66% of those from vocational schools (Source: Monica S. Fong and Gillian Paul, 'The Changing Role of Women in Employment in Eastern Europe', World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Population and Human Resources Division, Report no. 8213, February 1992, table 8, p. 44).

19. Szalai, 'Some Aspects', 1991, p. 158. See also Tables A5 and A7 in the Appendix. Girls' clear preference for 'gymnasium'-type secondary over technical vocational secondary schools in Hungary is documented in detail by Mária Ladó, Mária Adamik and Ferenc Tóth, 'Training for Women under Conditions of Crisis and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Hungary', draft paper for the ILO, 1991. For skill differentials in the workforce in Hungary, see also Katalin Koncz, 'The Position of Women in Decision-Making Processes in Hungary', Paper prepared for East-West Conference: 'Building a Europe without Frontiers: The Role of Women', Athens, 27-30 November, 1991: Referring to micro-census data from 1984, she claims that only 40% of women in the workforce were qualified, as compared with 75% of men.

20. Renata Siemieńska, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, 31.3.90; and 'Hidden Victims: Women in Post-Communist Poland', *News from Helsinki Watch*, vol. IV, issue 5, March 1992.

21. See Table A5.2 in the Appendix.

22. See Table A5.1 in the Appendix. See also (for the former GDR) Hildegard Maria Nickel, 'Ein perfektes Drehbuch: Geschlechtertrennung durch Arbeit und Sozialisation' ('A Perfect Script: Gender Divisions Through Work and Socialization'), in: Gislinde Schwarz and Christine Zenner, eds, *Wir wollen mehr als ein 'Vaterland'*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1990, p. 76; and (for Hungary), Mária Ladó et al, 'Training for Women', draft paper for the ILO, 1991.

23. Fong and Paul, 'The Changing Role of Women in Employment', 1992.

24. Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, June 1991.

25. Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy', 1992.

26. Szalai, 'Some Aspects', 1991. Recent Hungarian unemployment data echoes the predominance of women in administration. A breakdown according to professional groups in May 1992 shows women as constituting 41% of the total number registered unemployed, but within that, a high 66.5% and 88.9% of two levels of administrators, and 63.4% of total non-manual workers. (Source: *Labour Market Monthly Survey*, 1992, Országos Munkaügyi Központ, Budapest).

27. See Table A6 in the Appendix.

28. For the GDR figures, see Gunnar Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*, 1990, pp. 91-92, and Rosenberg, 'The New Home Economics'; for the observation about Poland, Renata Siemieńska, 'Women's Issues in the Transitional Period in Poland', mimeo, 1991; for the Polish figures, see Zofia Kuratowska, 'The Present Situation of Women in Poland', in: *The Impact of Economic and Political Reform on the Status of Women*, UN, 1992.

29. See Table A7 in the Appendix. For the GDR, see *Frauenreport 90*, *ibid.*; for Hungary, cf. Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy', 1992.

30. Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings', 1990.

31. See Table A8 in the Appendix. On Hungary, see Katalin Koncz, 'Results of and Tensions in Female Employment in Hungary', Budapest University of Economics, Budapest, mimeo, 1987.

32. Fong and Paul, 'The Changing Role of Women in Employment', 1992.

33. For information on the GDR, see Barbara Einhorn, 'Socialist Emancipation: The Women's Movement in the GDR', in: Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, Marilyn B. Young, eds,

Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1989, pp. 282-306; and Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*, pp. 94-95. On Poland, see Renata Siemieńska, 'Women in Leadership Positions in Public Administration in Poland', Paper prepared for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/UNESCO Conference, Bonn, July 1987; and Siemieńska, 'Polish Women and Polish Politics Since World War II', in: *Journal of Women's History*, vol. 3, no. 1, spring 1991, p. 112. On Hungary, see Katalin Koncz, 'Results of and Tensions in Female Employment', 1987; Koncz, 'The Position of Women in Decision-Making Processes in Hungary', 1991.

34. For the former GDR, see Dorothy Rosenberg, 'Shock Therapy', 1991, p. 13, who cites 1978 figures of 8.5% tenured professors, 49% doctors, 52% dentists, 64% pharmacists, and for 1986, 52% judges who were women. Einhorn, 'Socialist Emancipation', 1989, pp. 289-90, gives 57% of dentists and 52% of doctors who were women in 1983. These figures compare favourably with Western figures for 1987, showing 4% of lawyers and 16% of doctors who were women in the UK; 15% of judges, 14% of lawyers, 23% of doctors, and 20% of dentists who were women in West Germany; but only 8% of lawyers, 6% of dentists, and 17% of doctors who were women in the US. Siemieńska, 'Women in Leadership Positions', 1987, gives a figure of 54.5% of Polish judges who were women in 1986; and according to an ILO Report II, 'Equality of Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Health and Medical Services' (ILO, Geneva, 1992, p. 9), 67.6% of Polish doctors were women in 1980.

35. Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy', 1992; Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*; ILO, 'Equality of Opportunity', 1992, *ibid.*

36. Brigitte Reimann, *Franziska Linkerhand*, Verlag Neues Leben, Berlin, 1974.

37. Rosenberg, 'Shock Therapy', 1991, p. 139.

38. See Tables A9.1 and A9.2 in the Appendix.

39. For Czechoslovakia, Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings', 1990, and Ludmila Venerová, 'Brief Survey of the Situation of Czechoslovakian Women at the Beginning of the Transitional Period from Centrally-Planned to Market Economy', in: *The Impact of Economic and Political Reform on the Status of Women*, UN, 1992, who gives a figure of 16% total women in business management positions, of which 10.56% are in lower, 3.98 in middle and only 1.46% are in top management; for Poland, see Ewa Gontarczyk-Wesola, Country Report on Poland, 1989, mimeo; for Hungary, see Rózsa Kulcsár, 'The Socio-Economic Conditions of Women in Hungary', in: Sharon L. Wolchik and Alfred G. Meyer, *Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1985, p. 199, table 11.3; and Katalin Koncz, 'The Position of Women in Decision-Making Processes', 1991.

40. Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 90*, pp. 94-5.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-6.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Anastasia Posadskaya and Natalia Zakharova, 'To Be a Manager: Changes for Women in the USSR', ILO, Geneva, 1990.

44. Renata Siemieńska, 'Women, Work and Gender Equality in Poland: Reality and its Social Perception', in: Wolchik and Meyer, eds, *Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe*, 1985, p. 314; and Siemieńska, Peć, Zawód, Polityka: *Kobiryt w Życiu Publicznym w Polsce (Gender, Profession, Politics: Women in Public Life in Poland)*, Warsaw University: Institute of Sociology, 1990, tables 6, 7, pp. 108, 111. Czechoslovak figures are cited by Miša Castle-Kanerová, 'A Culture of Strong Women in the Making?', in: Corrin, *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, 1992, p. 104.

45. Polish information in: *Financial Times*, 30.1.91; For Hungary, see Szilvia Borbély, 'Panes et Circenses: The Decline in Living Standards in Hungary', mimeo, 1991; ITOR, *Leading Economic Indicators for Hungary*, 1992.

46. For some of this information on inflation, wages and prices in the transition period, see Barbara Einhorn and Swasti Mitter, 'A Comparative Analysis of Women's Industrial Participation During the Transition from Centrally-Planned to Market Economies in

East Central Europe', in: *The Impact of Economic and Political Reform on the Status of Women*, UN, 1992. On Hungary, Borbély, *ibid.*; ITOR, *ibid.* On Bulgaria, see the *Guardian*, 18 February 1991. Polish information from Barbara Einhorn, Interview with Professor Jerzy Osiatyński, at the time Minister of Planning, as of 1992 Poland's Finance Minister, Warsaw, 1 April 1990; also *Independent*, 31 January 1991.

47. Ewa Gontarczyk-Wesoła, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Poznań, April 2–3, 1990; Izabela Nowacka, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, June 1991. For the East German examples, see 'Frauen in den neuen Bundesländern: Die Verliererinnen der Einheit?' ('Women in the New Federal States: The Losers of Unification?'), in *Stern*, no. 46, 1992.

48. Monika Lopez was profiled and quoted in: 'Frauen in den neuen Bundesländern', *ibid.*, 46/92, p. 122 [my translation, BE].

49. Borbély, 'Panet et Circenses', 1991. Two polls, cited in the *Guardian*, 2 July 1992 and 23 July 1992.

50. For data on female unemployment rates in the former GDR, see IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit), *Aktuelle Daten vom Arbeitsmarkt (Current Data on the Labour Market)*. This is a regularly updated publication. See also the *Guardian*, 6 May 1992. For data on Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, see Fong and Paul, 'The Changing Role of Women in Employment', 1992, tables 7A, 7B, pp. 42–43. For Czechoslovakia, data supplied by sociologist Hana Navarová, Prague, September 1992.

51. Posadskaya is quoted in the *Guardian*, 30.6.92.

52. Source: *Labour Market Monthly Survey*, no. 5, 1992, Országos Munkagyi Központ, Budapest.

53. This figure was quoted in *Financial Times*, 26.3.91.

54. The move westwards is a continuous wave. As Hungarian historian István Rév said, there is no former state socialist country for whom there is not another which constitutes the 'East' (lecture on 'Post-Communist National Identity' at Sussex University, 18.1.93).

55. Fong and Paul, 'Women's Employment in Central and Eastern Europe: The Gender Factor', article in *Transition: Newsletter about Reforming Economies*, vol. 3, no. 6, June 1992, based on the authors' World Bank Report no. 8213, February 1992.

56. Winkler, ed., *Frauenreport 1990*, pp. 49–50.

57. See Table A5.1 in the Appendix.

58. Mária Ladó and Ferenc Tóth, 'Zwei verschiedene Welten: Die neuen Technologien und Frauenarbeit', ('Two Distinct Worlds: New Technologies and Women's Work'), in: G. Aichholzer and G. Schienstock, eds, *Arbeitsbeziehungen im technischen Wandel (Labour Relations and Technological Change)*, Edition Sigma, Berlin, 1989, pp. 201–14; Margaret Sutherland, 'Women's Studies and the Social Position of Women in Eastern and Western Europe', ENWS (European Network for Women's Studies) Seminar Report, The Hague, November 1990.

59. Antoni Kukliński, 'Poland – The Difficult Stage of Transformation', in: Antoni Kukliński and B. Jałowiecki, eds, *Local Development in Europe: Experiences and Prospects, Regional and Local Studies*, no. 5, Warsaw, 1990, p. 37.

60. Sources: Ladó, 'Women in the Transition to a Market Economy', 1992; Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, Interview with Barbara Einhorn, Warsaw, June 1991.

61. Statistics on Polish women, cited by Helsinki Watch, 'Hidden Victims', 1992, p. 7; Fong and Paul, 'The Changing Role of Women', 1992, table 10, p. 45; Kuratowska, 'The Present Situation of Women in Poland', 1992; Małgorzata Tarasiewicz, 'Women in Poland', 1991; and her presentation to the Workshop on the Economic Implications of Transformation for Women in East Central Europe at the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Bratislava, March, 1992.

62. On the 'train a trainer' scheme, information from documents prepared by OWEN in Berlin; on Bulgaria, see Dimitrina Petrova, 'The Farewell Dance: Women in the

Bulgarian Transition', Paper presented to the conference on 'Mary Wollstonecraft and 200 Years of Feminism', Sussex University, 5–6 December 1992; and T. Davidkov, 'The Bulgarian and His Business', *Bulgarian Quarterly*, no. 3, 1991, p. 125.

63. Information about Women's Association Mission from the organization's brochures and verbal reports. On Hungary, see Júlia Szalai, 'Some Aspects of the Changing Situation of Women in Hungary', in: *Signs*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1991, p. 162; Einhorn and Mitter, 'A Comparative Analysis of Women's Industrial Participation', 1992.

64. Rita Szilágyi, letter to Barbara Einhorn, Summer 1992.

65. *Der Spiegel*, no. 48, 1991.

66. Valentina Dobrokhotova, in: Tatyana Mamonova, ed., *Women and Russia: Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 7.

67. 'Verkaufte Kinder' ('Children for Sale'), report in *Emma*, no. 12, December 1992, p. 25 [translation mine, BE].

68. Baranskaya, *A Week Like Any Other* (1969), 1989, pp. 59–60.

69. Petra Drauschke and Margit Stolzenburg, 'Are Lone Mothers Slipping into Poverty?' in: *Weiblick*, newsletter of the Independent Women's Association (UFV), 2/92, pp. 13–15. The case of Ute Pust was cited in an article pointing out that long-term unemployment affects lone mothers particularly in the new Federal states, in: *Der Spiegel*, no. 24, 1992, p. 99. On Russia, see the *Guardian*, 30 June 1992.

70. Szalai, 'Some Aspects', 1991, pp. 155, 169. Castle-Kaněrová, 'A Culture of Strong Women in the Making?', 1992, p. 122.

71. Heide Haack's story was quoted from: 'Frauen in den neuen Bundesländern', *Stern*, no. 46, 1992, p. 126 [my translation, BE].

72. Jiřina Šiklova, in: Bob Deacon and Júlia Szalai, eds, *Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist Welfare?*, Avebury, Aldershot, 1990, pp. 194–199.

73. Rosenberg, 'Shock Therapy', 1991, pp. 12–13.

74. Rosenberg, *ibid.*, p. 13; Szalai, 'Some Aspects', 1991, p. 160; Siemienińska, 'Women, Work and Gender Equality in Poland', 1985, p. 312.

75. The *Guardian*, 6 May 1992.

76. Navarová, 'Impact of the Economic and Political Changes in Czechoslovakia on Women', Paper to EC Workshop on 'The Impact of Economic and Social Changes on the Position of Women in Eastern and Central Europe', Brussels, 24–25 January 1991; Kroupová, 'Women, Employment and Earnings', 1990, p. 21.