

Does gender ideology explain differences between countries regarding the involvement of women and of men in paid and unpaid work?

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Women spend more time doing household work than men, and men spend more time working at paying jobs outside the home than women. But studies also show that there are major differences between countries regarding the degree to which women and men involve themselves in different kinds of labour activity. The main aim of the article is to analyse the significance of gender ideology when studying differences between countries regarding the involvement of women and men in paid and unpaid work. The analysis is based on national random samples from ten OECD countries that were collected within the framework of ISSP 1994. The conclusions are: (a) gender ideology has an impact in all the studied countries on the degree to which women and men involve and engage themselves in labour and (b) gender ideology partially explains the differences between countries regarding women's and men's involvement in paid and unpaid work.

Mikael Nordenmark

Department of Sociology, Umeå University, Sweden

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Mikael Nordenmark, Department of Sociology, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
E-mail: mikael.nordenmark@soc.umu.se

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Introduction

In many Western economies, women and men work about the same number of hours. However, there is a clear difference between how women and men divide their work. Women spend more time doing household work – doing laundry, cooking meals, cleaning the house, taking care of children – than men do. On the other hand, men spend more time working at paying jobs outside the home than women do. This means that men generally have more professional jobs with higher wages. But studies also show that there are major differences between countries regarding the degree to which women and men involve themselves in different kinds of labour activity. This study examines whether gender ideology can explain some of the differences between countries regarding the engagement of women and men in paid and unpaid work. This is done by examining how gender ideology influences paid and unpaid work in ten OECD countries, classified as either conservative welfare states (Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany), liberal welfare states (the United States,

Canada and Great Britain) or social democratic welfare states (Norway and Sweden).

Several studies indicate that women in Western countries do most of the housework, which Shelton and John (1996) define as 'unpaid work done to maintain family members and/or a home'. Most US studies show that women do approximately twice as much household work as men and time diary studies in Sweden indicate that women perform almost two thirds of the non-paying household work (e.g. Blair & Johnson, 1992; Coltrane, 2000; Coverman & Sheley, 1986; Greenstein, 2000; Hochschild, 1997; Kalleberg & Rosenfeld, 1990; Morris, 1990; Pahl, 1984; Presland & Antill, 1987; Presser, 1994; Ross, Mirowsky & Huber, 1983; Shamir, 1986; Shelton & John, 1996; Statistics Sweden, 2000; Szinovacz & Harpster, 1994). In contrast to household work, men do a majority of the paid work outside the home. Even though the majority of new jobs in the European Union have gone to women rather than to men during the last decade or so, women represent only around 40 per cent of those in employment across the Union (OECD, 2000).

However, there are also marked differences between Western nations when studying labour involvement among women and men. Statistics from the OECD (employment levels for 1995) show that female employment rates generally are low in southern European countries. For instance, the employment rate for women in Spain is 32 per cent and for Italy, 36 per cent. The German-speaking nations of Germany, Austria and Switzerland form a cluster with female employment levels between 55 and 60 per cent, followed by the English-speaking countries, Canada, Great Britain and the USA where the employment levels for women are 62, 63 and 66 per cent, respectively. The highest female employment rates are found in the Nordic nations. For example, around 70 per cent of Swedish women are employed, which is close to the employment rates for men (OECD, 2000). Since the level of engagement in household labour is measured in varying ways in different studies and countries, it is difficult to compare these figures. However, when analysing results from time-use studies done in some of the above mentioned countries, there seems to be a pattern indicating that the time spent on housework is more equally shared in countries where the female employment levels are relatively high (United Nations, 1995).

How can we explain the differences in female and male labour activity within a country and among the countries under consideration? A majority of the sociological theories concerned with labour involvement are derived from studies of household distribution of labour. One of the most frequently discussed and analysed explanations of the extent to which women and men participate in paid and unpaid labour is gender ideology. Gender ideology can be defined as the beliefs or attitudes that a person has about gender roles. From childhood onwards, women and men acquire gender role attitudes through the socialisation process, including preferences for how women and men should behave. Unconsciously or not, they develop a gender strategy (Hochschild, 1997), which means making plans and emotional preparation for action that are in line with the learned gender ideology. When reaching adulthood, most women and men will act in line with the gender ideology they have been exposed to. For example, women and men choose their work according to the gender roles they have learned. The assumption is that men and women who have acquired a traditional gender ideology will represent a relatively traditional division of labour, and women and men who hold more egalitarian beliefs about gender will represent a more balanced division of work. The theory has often been verified in studies of the division of household labour within countries, but most results show a stronger impact from gender role attitudes on division of labour among men than among women (e.g. Baxter, 1992; Blair & Johnson, 1992; Blair & Lichter, 1991; Greenstein, 1996; Hochschild, 1989; Presser, 1994; Ross, 1987).

There are reasons to assume that there are differences between countries regarding gender ideology, which in turn may explain some of the national differences in labour involvement between women and men presented earlier. According to Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification of welfare state typologies (further discussed in Esping-Andersen, 1999) it is possible to distinguish three main welfare state types representing varying beliefs about how to organise individual and family welfare: conservative, liberal and social democratic welfare states. The conservative welfare states are characterised by values like minimisation of (labour) market-distributed welfare and the preservation of status differences and traditional family norms. Liberal welfare states favour means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers and a predilection for market-provided welfare. The third type of welfare regime is the social democratic, which tries to offer universal social rights and de-commodification of social rights, even to the new middle classes. In contrast to the conservative welfare regime, the ideal is to maximise individual independence and to minimise family dependence.

Feminist academics have called attention to the fact that the social policy contexts are not gender neutral. They are embedded in, and are representations of, gender role values that may vary between countries (Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1999; Walby, 1994). As representations of gender ideology, social policy systems represent gender ideologies on a macro level that can affect values and behaviour among individuals. This means that social policy contexts, in some sense, represent gender ideologies on a structural level, which may affect and maintain the gender ideology among individuals. A social policy context characterised by a relatively large emphasis on egalitarianism and individual independence could be expected to have a different effect on gender ideologies among individuals from a social policy context supporting the male-breadwinner family and more traditional gender relations.

The first five countries included in this study – Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany – can be placed in the conservative welfare state typology. Although there have been suggestions implying that Japan has developed an East-Asian welfare model, including some universal welfare, the structure of social policy is non-universal, with public assistance mainly for the poor, which is characteristic of conservative welfare states (Boling, 1998; Kwon, 1997). In addition, the categorisation of Spain and Italy as conservative welfare regimes has been questioned. Leibfried (1992) places Spain and Italy in a welfare system called the Latin Rim, which is characterised by less general social security and a different labour-market structure from, for instance, Germany. However, the strong role of religion and traditional family norms in these countries implies that Spain and Italy have much in common with the countries identified

as conservative welfare states. Austria and Germany are, perhaps, the most typical conservative welfare states. A passive social policy and support for the male-breadwinner family are characteristics of these countries.

The United States, Canada and Great Britain belong to the liberal welfare typology, and Norway and Sweden are social democratic welfare states. Esping-Andersen (1990) calls the United States and Canada 'typical examples of states with liberal regimes', which means states emphasising self-reliance, mainly through paid labour. This categorisation can be questioned. For instance, Canada is a diverse country and has recently received a significant number of immigrants from Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, which are regions that are characterised by relatively traditional norms. However, overall and in general terms, Canada is probably closest to representing a liberal welfare state [sense queried with author]. The liberal trend in Great Britain in recent decades has led to its inclusion in the liberal cluster. Lastly, Norway and Sweden, where social democratic forces have developed a Scandinavian welfare model, are characterised by universal schemes and a strong ambition to create full employment.

As described earlier, there seems to be a more traditional division of labour in conservative welfare states than in countries seen as liberal and social democratic welfare regimes. Furthermore, countries classified as conservative welfare states have in common a relatively strong belief in upholding traditional family ties and norms. This includes support from the state for the male-breadwinner family, meaning families consisting of a man who is employed full-time and a woman who has the main responsibility for housework and childcare. Characteristics of the liberal and the social democratic welfare states include encouragement for individual independence, mainly through paid labour in the case of the liberal welfare states and through paid labour in combination with universal schemes in the social democratic welfare states. It is more likely that women and men living in conservative systems have developed a more traditional gender ideology than women and men living in liberal or social democratic welfare systems. These differences in gender ideology may explain some of the country differences in labour involvement between women and men.

Of course, it is impossible to establish exactly the causal direction between gender ideology and labour involvement. These factors influence each other in complicated ways. Traditional gender and family norms increase the likelihood of a traditional division of labour, and when dividing work in a traditional way there is a high probability for that the traditional gender ideology will be strengthened even more. However, there are reasons to assume that a relationship between gender ideology and labour involvement can be interpreted to a great extent as an impact from gender ideology on

labour involvement. If a person is raised in a society that strives to protect traditional family and gender norms, there is a high probability that she or he will live and act according to a gender-specific ideology. This in turn increases the probability that women and men will perform in line with a traditional division of labour, meaning that women will do a majority of the household work and men will devote themselves mainly to paid work. The main point in the causal argument is that gender ideology is mainly developed during childhood, which means before the individuals' actual level of engagement in paid and unpaid work.

Besides gender ideology, the most frequently discussed explanations for division of labour are individual or relative resources, stage in life cycle and time availability. Individual resources have often been measured by using variables such as actual or relative education, class position or income. The hypothesis is that housework is divided through negotiation between spouses and that individual resources, such as a high level of education or income, grant the person power and strengthen his or her bargaining position. One example of results supporting this theory is that women who have low economic resources are more likely to do more household work compared with women who have extensive economic resources. Some of the studies have analysed the effect of life-cycle stage by controlling for age and whether there are children living at home or not. Age is usually negatively correlated to an equal division of household labour, and studies of time-use show that cohabiting men with children increase their domestic work, but in relation to women they decrease their relative share of household work. Most studies analysing the effect of time availability on division of housework use time spent in paid work as a measure. In general, the division of housework is to some extent connected to men's and women's employment status. The results indicate that the more the woman is engaged in employment and the less the man works outside of the home, the more equal the division of household tasks (e.g. Baxter, 1992; Coltrane, 2000; Greenstein, 2000; Morris, 1990; Pahl, 1984; Presser, 1994; Shelton & John, 1996; Szinovacz & Harpster, 1994).

In conclusion, both paid and unpaid work are strongly gender segregated. Men are more strongly engaged in paid work and women do most of the housework. Even though this is valid for most regions of the world, there are notable differences between countries. Nations defined as conservative welfare regimes have a more marked traditional gender division of labour than countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states. Furthermore, in earlier studies gender ideology has been one of the factors that is significantly correlated to household division of labour. On the basis of what characterises the different welfare state types, it is reasonable to assume that individuals in liberal or social democratic

welfare states have a more egalitarian gender ideology than individuals living in conservative welfare states, which in turn may explain some of the state differences in labour involvement between women and men.

There have been many studies before the present study that have discussed and analysed the relationships between different welfare states and labour involvement. The unique thing with the present study is that it discusses and, above all, *empirically tests* the significance of gender ideology, which is assumed to be one central aspect of the welfare state, and what that means for labour involvement for women and men living in different national contexts. This means that it is not the welfare state type *per se* that is in focus, but the gender ideology values that are embedded in and related to a certain welfare state type. This leads us to the two hypotheses that are tested in this study. The first hypothesis is that gender ideology affects the degree to which women and men involve themselves in paid and unpaid work. The second and main hypothesis is that country differences in gender ideology explain to some extent national differences in labour involvement between women and men.

Method

The empirical data set used for testing the hypotheses is collected within the framework of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The purpose of ISSP is to create comparable statistics from various countries. The empirical data used comes from the 1994 module on Family and Changing Gender Roles. The aim of this study is to compare a number of countries with varying employment rates and social policy systems that have reliable data on labour involvement and gender ideology. The countries included are Japan, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria, the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Norway and Sweden. The samples vary from 1,000 to 2,500 respondents for each country.

It is of course not unproblematic to analyse statistics generated from comparative studies, which means that the results should be interpreted with some caution. There are at least two main limitations that are important to bear in mind when analysing the material. First, the framing of questions and attitudes is context dependent, which means that certain questions may be understood and interpreted differently in different national contexts. One way to strengthen the validity of different measures is to put together items into indexes, which for instance is done in this study for data on household work and gender ideology. Second, there are some differences between the studied countries regarding sampling, representativity and response rates. For instance, some countries have used probability sampling, whereas others have used a panel or a combination of a panel and probability sampling. However, the respondents are weighted according to the principles described in the

ISSP 1994 Codebook in order to make the samples correspondent to comparable sources of statistics in each country. This means that the samples should be fairly nationally representative (Hjerm, 1998; Svallfors, 1996).

Involvement in labour is mainly measured by current employment status (employed or not employed) and household division of labour, which is measured using an index consisting of four questions covering major tasks that, in most cases, have to be done continuously in a household. The questions are as follows: Who does the laundry? Who cares for sick family members? Who shops for groceries? Who decides what to have for dinner? The answers have been summarised into a 'housework index' that varies between -8 (the man always does all four tasks) and 8 (the woman always does all four tasks). Other studies have shown that a common problem when using this kind of indicator is that men usually overestimate their share of the household work relative to women's ratings (e.g. Nordenmark, 2000; Perrucci, Potter & Rhoads, 1978; Shamir, 1986). However, if one assumes that this is a similar problem in all the studied countries, it is still fruitful to compare countries. Being employed and managing a relatively large share of the housework indicate a strong involvement in paid and unpaid work respectively.

The main independent variable is gender ideology, which is measured by seven statements indicating gender-role attitudes:

- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.
- A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
- All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.
- A job is all right, but what a woman really wants is a home and children.
- Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
- A man's job is to earn money; a woman's is to look after the home and family.
- It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes out to work.

The responses to these statements are strongly correlated to each other (factor analysis and correlation coefficients not shown) and are therefore included in a 'gender ideology index' varying from 0 to 28; the higher the score, the more egalitarian the gender ideology (for other studies using the same questions, see Braun, Scott & Alwing, 1994; Panayotova & Brayfield, 1997; Scott, Alwin & Braun, 1996; Sundström, 1999).

The control variables used are variables that may explain country differences and, in earlier studies, have been significantly correlated to division of labour. Variables indicating life-cycle stage are age (<30, 31–40, 41–50, 51+) and, in the analyses concerning employment

status, cohabiting (yes or no). Education is used as a measurement of individual resources (no education, primary school, secondary two-year, secondary three-year, university). The analyses of division of housework also include income (monthly income in quartiles) and relative income (man much more, man a bit more, about the same, woman a bit more, women much more) as measures of individual resources, and employment status of the respondent and his or her partner (not employed or employed) as indicators of time availability.

Results

This section examines whether gender ideology has an impact on the degree to which women and men involve themselves in paid and unpaid work and, above all, whether country differences regarding gender ideology to some extent explain country differences in labour involvement. First, gender ideology values, employment rates and the division of housework between spouses in the ten countries are presented. Then, the correlations between gender ideology and involvement in paid and unpaid work by country are presented. This section concludes by studying the relationships between countries and engagement in labour when controlling for gender ideology and other relevant variables. Each table presents the results for women and men separately.

Table 1 shows the employment rates and the values on the gender ideology and the division of housework indexes in the ten countries. When studying gender ideology, a general conclusion is that women are more gender liberal than men in all the studied countries. Furthermore, there are marked differences in gender ideology values between conservative welfare states and countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states. Italy had the lowest mean values on the gender ideology index among both woman and men, indicating that Italians represent the most traditional

gender ideology. The other countries classified as conservative welfare regimes – Japan, Spain, Austria and Germany – had about the same values. Although in recent years there has been significant immigration to Canada from regions that are characterised by relatively traditional norms, Canadian women and men, on a general level, had the most egalitarian gender ideology followed by the social democratic welfare states Norway and Sweden.

The same clusters of countries appear when studying labour involvement by looking at the employment rates for women. Employment rates among the conservative welfare states varied between 34 and 54 per cent (the lowest rates for Spain and Italy) and among the liberal/social democratic welfare states between 60 and 72 per cent (the highest rates for the United States, Canada and Sweden). However, there was no sharp difference between the conservative and the liberal/social democratic welfare states when studying the employment rates among men. In this case the highest employment rates were found in Japan and the United States and the lowest in Spain and Great Britain. Furthermore, results indicating involvement in housework among cohabitants were mainly structured by country according to the same pattern as the results for gender ideology and female employment rates. Women did a smaller and men a larger share of the domestic work in the liberal/social democratic welfare states than in the countries categorised as conservative welfare states, with the exception of women living in Great Britain, who reported a 'division of housework score' on a level with Germany. Japanese couples had the most traditional distribution of household work, followed by Spain and Italy.

To sum up, the results in Table 1, regarding gender ideology and level of involvement in paid and unpaid work, show a dividing line between countries categorised as conservative welfare regimes and countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare regimes. In

Table 1. Gender ideology (mean), employment rate (percentage) and division of housework (mean) by country (18–64 years).

Country	Women			Men		
	Gender ideology	Employed	Division of housework	Gender ideology	Employed	Division of housework
Japan	15.1	54	6.5	13.9	86	5.8
Spain	15.0	34	5.9	14.0	64	4.9
Italy	13.5	40	5.4	12.3	78	4.8
Austria	14.4	50	4.6	13.5	79	3.9
Germany (FRG)	15.3	52	4.0	13.7	80	3.6
United States	17.3	70	3.2	15.4	85	2.2
Canada	19.0	72	3.4	17.9	72	2.1
Great Britain	17.1	62	4.0	16.1	68	2.7
Norway	17.9	60	3.1	16.2	76	2.3
Sweden	18.0	70	3.1	16.6	75	2.5
Total	16.4	56	4.3	14.9	76	3.5
N	6,672	6,796	4,310	5,894	6,187	3,674

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Table 2. Correlation matrix. The probability of being employed, working hours (18–74 years, no students or pensioners) and division of housework (cohabitants) by gender ideology for each country (Pearson's).

	Women			Men		
	Employed	Working hours	Division of housework	Employed	Working hours	Division of housework
<i>Gender ideology</i>						
Japan	0.16***	0.11**	–0.10*	0.03	0.11*	–0.18**
Spain [†]	0.31***		–0.26***	–0.04		–0.31***
Italy	0.21***	0.18***	–0.21***	–0.14*	–0.18**	–0.27***
Austria	0.35***	0.26***	–0.16**	–0.03	0.03	–0.27**
Germany (FRG) [†]	0.32***		–0.22***	0.09*		–0.32***
United States	0.33***	0.32***	–0.21***	0.08	0.05	–0.22***
Canada	0.34***	0.38***	–0.24***	0.12*	0.20***	–0.32***
Great Britain	0.34***	0.40***	–0.14*	0.15**	0.00	–0.19**
Norway	0.34***	0.39***	–0.26***	0.10**	0.06	–0.33***
Sweden	0.18***	0.26***	–0.09	–0.05	0.04	–0.28***

Notes: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

[†] No statistics on working hours.

general, Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany were characterised by a more traditional gender ideology, a lower involvement in paid work among women and a lower involvement in household work among men compared with the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Norway and Sweden. This means that men and women living in the countries classified as conservative welfare states represent a more traditional gender ideology and division of labour than men and women in the liberal and social democratic welfare states.

The analysis of the level of involvement in paid work in Table 2 includes women and men aged 18–75, but not students and pensioners. The reason for excluding these two categories is that a majority of students and pensioners are either preparing themselves for employment or have been employed in the past, which means that they probably have, or at least have had, a relatively strong work involvement. It is not correct to include students or pensioners in the group categorised as 'not employed', because 'not employed' is used as an indicator of low engagement in paid work. Regardless of their level of work involvement, a majority of students and pensioners have no opportunity for employment for the moment. Table 2 also includes the number of working hours per week as a measure of the level of involvement in employment.

The influence of gender ideology on employment in each country can be evaluated by considering an individual's employment status or the number of hours an individual works. These two factors were positive and had a significant correlation to gender ideology for women in all countries. This means that a person with an egalitarian gender ideology is more likely to be employed and to work many hours compared with a person who has a more traditional gender ideology. Among men, on the other hand, there were fewer and weaker significant

relationships between gender ideology and the level of engagement in paid work. However, the coefficients measuring the degree to which gender ideology was related to division of housework painted the opposite picture. There were stronger correlation coefficients among men than among women. This shows that the more egalitarian the gender ideology, the larger the share of the household work that was done by the man. The results indicate that an egalitarian gender ideology is loosely related to a relatively low engagement in housework among women and strongly related to a relatively high engagement in housework among men in all the studied countries.

All in all, the results presented in Table 2 correspond to the hypothesis that gender ideology influences the level of labour involvement among women and men in all the countries included in this study, but there are some interesting deviations. First, the relationship between gender ideology and the level of involvement in paid labour was mainly valid for women and, second, gender ideology seems to be more strongly correlated to the level of engagement in housework among men than among women. The last result corresponds with a majority of earlier studies that have analysed the relationship between gender ideology and household distribution of labour. The final section of this study analyses whether gender ideology explains some of the country differences in labour involvement. This is done by investigating the relationships between nations and the level of engagement in paid and unpaid work when controlling for gender ideology and variables measuring life-cycle stage, individual resources and time availability. This analysis allows us to see whether the general relationship between gender ideology and labour involvement exists even when holding other relevant variables constant.

Table 3 shows the probability of being employed and the division of housework between women and men. Models A, D, G and K compared employment rates and division of household work between women and men living in different national context without controlling for any other independent variables. Models B, E, H and L analysed what happens to the differences between countries regarding employment and division of household work when controlling for gender ideology. Models C and F also controlled for age, civil status and education. Lastly, J and N included income, relative income and employment status of respondents and their partners.

Model A confirms the marked difference in the probability of women being employed that exists between countries belonging to the conservative welfare state typology and countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states. The likelihood of being employed was much lower in Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany compared with Sweden. Among men (Model D), all states categorised as conservative, except for Spain, had significant higher probabilities of being employed. Models B and E show the relationships between countries and employment when controlling for gender ideology. Corresponding to the results in Table 2, gender ideology was shown to have a much stronger relationship to the likelihood of being employed among women than among men, and it is also mainly among women that gender ideology can explain some of the differences between conservative and liberal/social democratic welfare states. According to Models A and B, the probability of Japanese, Spanish, Italian, Austrian and German women being employed increased by between 0.15 to 0.35 points in relation to Swedish women, and the explained variance increased by 10 per cent when gender ideology was introduced into the analysis. Women living in Italy and Austria show the largest increase of the probability of being employed compared with women in Sweden, when holding gender ideology constant.

Models C and F controlled for variables indicating life-cycle stage and personal resources. The likelihood of being employed was highest among middle-aged women and men. Being cohabitant is negatively correlated to employment among women and positively among men. The measurement of individual resources, such as education, was positively correlated among both women and men – the higher the level of education, the higher the probability of being employed. Of most interest for this study is how these relationships affected the impact from country and gender ideology on the likelihood of being employed. The answer to this question is: not much. It is true that the impact from gender ideology decreased a bit among women, but the gap between conservative and liberal/social democratic welfare states increased instead of decreased. There was

also a marginal increase of the R^2 among women when variables measuring life-cycle stage and individual resources were introduced. However, among men the R^2 doubles from 7 to 14 per cent.

All the conservative welfare states had a more traditional division of household labour than Sweden, but as Models G, H, K and L in Table 3 show the differences in relation to Sweden decreased when controlling for gender ideology. Furthermore, gender ideology is more strongly correlated to household division of labour among men, and it is also among men that the largest changes of the relationships between the conservative welfare regimes and division of household labour can be seen, when holding gender ideology constant. The decrease of the coefficients for countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states was more modest when gender ideology was introduced. This means that women's and men's gender ideology partially explain why women do a larger share of the housework in Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany than in most of the countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states.

Models I and M indicated that the higher the age, the larger the share of the housework that is done by the woman. Education was negatively correlated to the division of household tasks among men, meaning that highly educated men do a larger share of the domestic work than men with a lower level of education. Models J and N also controlled for variables connected to labour-market position, indicating individual resources and time availability. Personal income was negatively related to division of housework among women. This means that a high income is connected to a relatively low involvement in household labour. Relative income was negatively correlated to division of housework among both women and men, indicating that the more women earn and the less men earn in relation to their partner, the smaller share of the housework was done by the woman. If the respondent not was employed, she or he did a larger share of the household work than if she or he was employed, and this result was most significant if the respondent was a man. The partner's employment status is also of importance. Women in particular, but also men who have a partner who is not employed do a smaller share of the domestic work than if they have a partner who is employed. Lastly, although the coefficients for gender ideology decrease when controlling for other variables, gender ideology is still significantly correlated to division of housework in Models J and N.

What then are the main conclusions that can be drawn from the results in Table 3? First, gender ideology explains some, but far from all, of the country differences that exist in the level of involvement in paid work among women. When holding gender ideology constant, the differences between the conservative and

Table 3. The probability of being employed (Logistic regression. 18–74 years, no students or pensioners) and division of housework (OLS-regression. Cohabitants) by country, gender ideology, age, civil status, education, income, relative income and respondents' and partners' employment status. Unstandardised b-coefficients.

	Employment						Division of housework								
	Women			Men			Women			Men					
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D	Model E	Model F	Model G	Model H	Model I	Model J	Model K	Model L	Model M	Model N	
Constant	1.28	−0.68	−0.76	1.61	1.17	−0.80	3.15	4.62	3.87	4.08	2.55	4.47	3.70	4.22	
<i>Country</i>															
Japan	−1.10***	−0.88***	−1.02***	1.19***	1.35***	1.22***	3.36***	3.16***	3.11***	2.53***	3.29***	2.96***	2.96***	2.53***	
Spain ¹	−1.83***	−1.67***		−0.26	−0.20		2.75***	2.45***			2.48***	2.01***			
Italy	−1.53***	−1.20***	−1.24***	1.05***	1.18***	1.39***	2.21***	1.87***	1.83***	1.38***	2.24***	1.65***	1.63***	1.28***	
Austria	−1.10***	−0.75***	−0.79***	1.17***	1.41***	1.51***	1.47***	1.13***	1.15***	0.84***	1.35***	0.90***	0.93***	0.72***	
Germany (FRG)	−1.00***	−0.85***	−0.86***	0.69***	0.83***	1.06***	0.75***	0.60***	0.58***	0.21	1.04***	0.61***	0.60***	0.31*	
United States	−0.36**	−0.37**	−0.73***	0.65**	0.71***	0.53*	0.21	0.14	0.15	−0.18	−0.29	−0.47**	−0.32*	−0.35*	
Canada	0.12	−0.10	−0.41**	0.30	0.28	−0.10	0.24	0.33*	0.33*	0.24	−0.46**	−0.37*	−0.22	−0.33*	
Great Britain	−0.65***	−0.68***	−0.72***	−0.63***	−0.63***	−0.83***	0.86***	0.81***	0.78***	0.39*	0.27	0.18	0.21	0.01	
Norway (Sweden ref)	−0.41**	−0.47**	−0.68***	0.25	0.32	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.07	−0.07	−0.19	−0.33*	−0.18	−0.25	
<i>Gender ideology</i>		0.12***	0.10***		0.03***	0.03**		−0.09***	−0.07***	−0.05***		−0.12***	−0.09***	−0.08***	
<i>Age</i> (−30 ref)															
31–40			0.05			0.39**			0.65***	0.65***			0.78***	0.69***	
41–50			0.52***			0.55**			0.93***	1.07***			0.92***	0.85***	
51–			−0.23*			−0.17			0.91***	1.29***			1.15***	1.26***	
<i>Cohabiting</i>			−0.61***			0.79***									
<i>Education</i>			0.21***			0.31***			−0.05	−0.01			−0.12***	−0.14***	
<i>Income</i>															
Relative income										−0.27***				−0.05	
R not employed										−0.13**				−0.18***	
P not employed										0.34**				−0.92***	
R ² 2	0.12	0.22	0.22	0.06	0.07	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.21	−0.99***	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.29	0.32

*** P < 0.001; ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05.

¹ No statistics on education. ² No statistics regarding logistic regression.

the liberal/social democratic welfare states decrease. When studying involvement in household labour by analysing the housework index, gender ideology explains some of the differences between the countries. Among women and especially among men, the level of engagement in housework became more equal between countries belonging to the conservative welfare state typology and countries classified as liberal or social democratic welfare states, when controlling for gender ideology. However, in addition, in this case there still are significant national differences when controlling for gender ideology. Second, gender ideology is correlated to labour involvement in the multivariate analyses. The correlations are strongest between gender ideology and the level of involvement in paid work among women, and between gender ideology and the degree of involvement in household work among men.

Third, variables indicating life-cycle stage, individual resources and time availability are also related to labour involvement. Middle-aged, single women and cohabiting men have a higher level of involvement in employment than the reference categories. Older women and younger men are more strongly engaged in housework, compared with younger women and older men. Quite natural, highly educated women and men have a higher probability of being employed than less-educated men and women. Furthermore, women with a high personal income and women and men with a high relative income have a relatively weak engagement in housework, which corresponds to the individual resource hypothesis. However, it is hard to judge the extent to which these results can be interpreted as an outcome of extensive individual resources that have been used to win a negotiation with the partner about household division of labour, or whether these variables indicate the time and energy spent on doing paid work. If the later is most significant, the results can be interpreted as a support for the time availability hypothesis. The hypothesis about the relevance of individual resources is placed into question even more by the result that highly educated men in fact do more household work than less-educated men do. That fact that the time spent in employment is of importance for the level of involvement in housework is verified by the results showing that women and men who are not employed are more strongly engaged in housework than those who are employed. It is of course also possible to interpret these last results in the opposite way, that is, the more time women and men spend on doing housework, the less the probability that they will be employed.

Concluding remarks

The aims of this study have been to analyse whether gender ideology has an impact on labour involvement among women and men and, above all, whether gender

ideology explains some of the national differences in the degree to which women and men involve themselves in paid and unpaid work. On the basis of the theoretical discussion, it was assumed that there should be major differences in gender ideology between countries classified as conservative welfare states on one hand, and countries categorised as liberal or social democratic welfare states on the other hand, which in turn may explain some of the national differences in labour involvement. The theoretical discussion resulted in the formulation of two hypotheses that were tested. The hypotheses were (1) gender ideology has an impact on the degree to which women and men involve themselves in paid and unpaid work and (2) country differences in gender ideology explain to some extent differences in labour involvement between women and men.

The results partially verify both hypotheses. Gender ideology is positively correlated to the probability of being employed and to working hours per week among women in all the studied countries, but men's gender ideology does not affect their own labour involvement to a great extent. Men seem to be strongly involved in paid work independent of their gender ideology. However, when studying the level of engagement in housework, gender ideology is significantly correlated in all nations among men and in all nations among women, except for Sweden. These results mean that women who have an egalitarian gender ideology are involved in paid labour to a greater extent and less involved in household labour, compared with women who have a more traditional gender ideology. Men with an egalitarian gender ideology are more involved in household labour than men with a more traditional gender ideology.

When analysing country differences, the results show that women and men living in countries classified as conservative welfare states (Japan, Spain, Italy, Austria and Germany) in general have a more traditional gender ideology and division of paid and unpaid labour, compared with liberal (the United States, Canada and Great Britain) and social democratic (Norway and Sweden) welfare states. Furthermore, country differences in gender ideology explain some of the differences that exist between nations regarding the level of involvement in paid work among women. When studying the level of involvement in household labour, gender ideology explains some of the differences between the relevant countries. Among women and particularly among men, the levels of engagement in housework became more equal between conservative welfare states and liberal or social democratic welfare states when controlling for gender ideology. The conclusion is that gender ideology explains some of the national differences concerning engagement in paid employment among women and some of the country differences in the level of involvement in household

work among both woman and men. However, although the state differences in labour involvement decrease when controlling for gender ideology, there are still significant differences between the studied countries.

Given the theoretical discussion presented in the introduction, there are reasons to assume that a large part of the existing correlation between gender ideology and labour involvement can be interpreted as an impact from gender ideology on the level of engagement in paid and unpaid labour. The main argument for this is that gender ideology is mainly transferred and developed during childhood and the level of labour involvement occurs during adulthood. Despite this, it is of course likely that some parts of the correlation coefficients represent selection effects and other causal directions. Further research based on longitudinal data is needed to further analyse and establish causal directions.

What then is the main explanation for the differences in labour involvement that still exist between the studied nations? A possible answer to this question concerns how each country looks at the role of the individual in relation to the role of the family. As noted in the introduction, one major difference between the conservative and the liberal/social democratic welfare regimes is that the conservative states offer a high degree of support for the male-breadwinner family, while the liberal and the social democratic welfare states support self-reliance, mainly by encouraging both men and women to engage themselves in paid labour. If then the political goal is to achieve gender equality in the sense that women and men are involved in both paid and unpaid work to the same degree, the liberal or the social democratic welfare systems should be preferred over the conservative welfare system.

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